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SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON POTUS FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
An Abstract of the Thesis by 
Daniel Clayton Hodges 
 
 
 History most often holds presidents as exclusively responsible for the success or 
failure of their foreign policies.  The purpose of this study is to identify the environment 
that presidents operate within to develop and pursue their international relationship goals.  
It is this environment itself that forms a system that exerts a great influence and is largely 
responsible for and expresses the foreign policies that presidents choose.  Five elements 
define this system:  the geopolitical situation, the actions of the prior administration, 
Congress, the election cycle, and the American domestic situation (GPACED).   This 
work demarcates the elements of GPACED, and their potential impacts on polices, 
followed by five historical case studies spanning six presidential administrations.  The 
National Security Act of 1947, and its subsequent amendments, created the Department 
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency.  This law altered the nature of foreign policy development by 
establishing a body for presidents to consult for policy development and decision making.  
President Eisenhower’s administration embraced this law and established precedents that 
are still relevant and influence today’s administrations.  History holds presidents alone 
accountable for foreign policy outcomes, but these case studies demonstrate that 
GPACED does indeed wield a significant influence on foreign policy.  This pressure 
often compels presidents to undertake strategies not of their choosing, or prevents them 
from executing their desired courses of action.  Historical analysis further demonstrates 
that GPACED follows a predictable pattern within the term limits of each presidency.  
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Those policies judged as successes normally occur early in a president’s term in office.  
GPACED most often prevents presidents from implementing chosen policies near the end 
of their administrations.  The case studies also demonstrate that the geopolitical 
environment, and Congress are the two most influential elements of the system on foreign 
policy.  This study concludes that GPACED has greater influence over the direction of 
United States foreign policy than the stated goals of the president, who ultimately 
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 Seen from the perspective of a participant in a combat tour in Al Anbar province, 
Iraq, it appeared in the summer of 2004 that President George Walker Bush had 
needlessly endangered the lives of military service members deployed to Iraq for political 
gain.  His transfer of sovereignty officially recognized the authority of the independent 
interim government of Iraq, which now held full responsibility for the country's 
governance and, most importantly, its security.  A United Nations Security Council 
resolution authorized this policy as well.  However, the war had rendered the Iraqis 
incapable of carrying out their responsibilities, predictably leading to an increase in 
coalition casualties.  It was a hollow, costly move that ceded hard-won progress.  By all 
appearances, the transfer of sovereignty was for domestic consumption; an effort to show 
President George W. Bush’s progress in Iraq to American voters on the eve of his 
reelection campaign. 
 At the time, it was clear that there were insufficient numbers of American and 
coalition troops in Iraq to accomplish the mission.  The marines and soldiers in Al Anbar 
province compensated for the lack of manpower by sustaining an exhaustive offensive 
posture.  By aggressively patrolling and raiding the enemy, they degraded their enemy's 
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ability to mine roads and ambush forces in the open.  After the transfer of sovereignty, 
coalition forces surrendered the initiative and adopted a more passive stance that allowed 
the enemy to resume the sabotage of roads critical to the support of coalition operations 
throughout the country.  Thus, instead of hunting down and killing the enemy, those 
forces merely protected roads and support bases as best they could.  Every military 
member in a vehicle became a mine detector and moving target for anti-Iraqi forces. 
 American presidents do select military foreign policy actions for domestic 
political purposes.  Ample documentation exists of domestic political considerations 
guiding presidents in their application of military force, often at the cost of increased risk 
and danger to U.S. combat troops.  The most widely accepted perception of presidential 
authority places the onus of responsibility for the success or failure of foreign policies on 
the president with little regard for the situation faced.  Those who deal with clearly 
untenable circumstances are labeled failures if their policies do not succeed, even though 
a president's leadership is but one factor in a system that dates from the Eisenhower 
administration.  That system's influence has grown and continues to grow through the 
present administration.  It, rather than a succession of presidents, is the key determinant 
of American foreign policy. 
 Admittedly, presidents take the credit and the blame for their country's military 
actions and, more generally, foreign policies.  Indeed, some of the latter bear the names 
of the initiating administrations.  The Truman Doctrine clearly credits America’s thirty-
third president with a policy of supporting countries threatened by the Soviet Union or 
communism; one that long outlived his time in office.  Even when not named after a 
president, some other foreign policies have been automatically attributed to specific 
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administrations.  Vietnamization, for example, belongs to Nixon.  Michael H. Hunt, in 
The American Ascendency:  How the United States Gained & Wielded Global 
Dominance (2007), argues that Congress has taken a back seat to presidential authority 
ever since Franklin D. Roosevelt's final term in office.  In such "imperial" presidencies, 
our presidents assume a degree of authority akin to that of prime ministers and kings.  
There have certainly been brief imperial periods, but the scope and complexity of U.S. 
foreign policy has increased exponentially since 1945.  Government bureaucracy has 
grown to accommodate the expanded responsibilities of America’s increased role in 
global politics, the sheer volume of tasks being far beyond any one individual's span of 
control. 
 Associating a foreign policy with a president not only implies ownership but 
connotes control.  However, the degree of presidential control over the direction and 
implementation of foreign policy is often deceptively small -- small enough that 
responsibility and accountability are two distinct matters.  This being the case, is it 
always reasonable to credit a president for a success or blame him for a failure?  The 
answers to such questions hinge upon our definition of responsibility.  If one is both 
responsible and accountable for an activity, that individual must possess sufficient means 
to determine its outcome.  But how much actual control do presidents have over foreign 
policy?  In Presidential Command, Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy 
From Richard Nixon to George W. Bush (2009), Peter W. Rodman tells us that presidents 
who are most successful in foreign policy are those who stay personally engaged in its 
execution and are, therefore, able to influence those who control the necessary resources 
and means.  Rodman’s assessment hardly evokes images of presidential command.  In 
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fact, influence over those who control the means to act is not, in and of itself, control.  
Foreign policy is beyond the span of control of an individual president even though it 
remains within the president's sphere of influence. 
 History and recent historiography both underline the limits of presidential control 
over foreign policy.  Ryan C. Hendrickson argues that sustained employment of military 
forces is the sole purview of Congress.  In The Clinton Wars:  The Constitution, 
Congress, and War Powers (2002), he contends that the president must consult with 
Congress before employing military force.  When force is employed, we see Congress 
placing restrictions on how presidents may use those forces.  William Bundy’s A Tangled 
Web:  The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (1998), shows Richard M. 
Nixon struggling to accomplish his goals after Congress denied him the ability to conduct 
operations in Cambodia.  Philippe R. Girard shows us the opposite scenario.  In Girard’s 
Clinton in Haiti:  The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti (2004), we see the Congressional 
Black Caucus pressuring a reluctant Bill Clinton into deploying combat forces to Haiti.  
So, too, can geopolitical realities force a president to drop his human rights principles and 
support a brutal dictatorship.  This we see in John Dumbrell’s The Carter Presidency:  A 
re-evaluation (1995), when Carter aids the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to prevent them from 
turning to the communist powers for support. 
 These earlier scenarios have bearing on perceptions of George W. Bush’s foreign 
policies in Iraq.  The elephant that sat in on every planning session and every current 
operations section of his deployed military forces was the dearth of equipment and 
manpower needed to do the job.  Nobody commented on it; it was just a given.  Marines 
and soldiers carried on as every individual attempted to do the work of ten people so that 
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the mission would be accomplished.  Terry H. Anderson’s Bush’s Wars (2011) provides 
some explanation for the military equipment and manpower shortages in 2004.  While 
skewering Bush and Rumsfeld, he nevertheless points out that both inherited the military 
that they took to war -- another restriction placed on a president’s foreign policy.  Indeed, 
where foreign policy and, especially, the employment of military force is concerned, the 
title "Commander in Chief" is itself an overstatement.  "Influencer in Chief" more 
accurately described the president’s role.  James Schlesinger, who filled key positions in 
three presidential administrations, shares his thoughts on presidential ability to enact 
foreign policy in America at Century’s End (1989).  Schlesinger contends that the 
executive branch can only lead through persuasion.  The highest art for an American 
statesman, he argues, is the ability to forge consensus. 
 A pattern of foreign policy can be visualized.  Presidents have the most influence 
early in their terms.  Clark A. Murdock’s Improving the Practice of National Security 
Strategy:  A New Approach for The Post-Cold War World (2004), shows that the election 
cycle is likely to see administrations’ foreign policies driven by domestic pressures.  
Murdock points out that presidential candidates often create unachievable expectations 
with their campaign rhetoric and that administrations may also set out to attain the 
unattainable once in power.  In her analysis of several political science statistical studies, 
Brandice Canes-Wrone’s Who Leads Whom (2006) finds that presidents sometimes cater 
to mass opinion and support policies with which they disagree or policies that are not in 
the best interest of the American public.  Canes-Wrone notes that presidents engage the 
public on foreign policy issues only at certain points in election cycles; especially when 
they trail in the polls. 
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 Sam Sarkesian’s U.S. National Security:  Policymakers, Processes, and Politics 
(1989) speaks of a national security system.  Sarkesian describes the impact of American 
democracy and our political system on foreign policy development while faulting leaders 
whose understanding of national security interests and policy development is poor.  
Leaders who understand the complexities of the environment in which a foreign policy is 
developed are at an advantage as they can make wise decisions based on that 
understanding.  Sarkesian argues this point effectively, yet the complex environment of 
which he writes is part of the same overall system that presidents cannot control.   
 Within this expanded context we can see the president less as the sole source of 
responsibility for foreign policy and more as a part of a system, albeit an important part.  
This system is an entity unto itself; one that ultimately determines which foreign policies 
are followed and how those policies are executed.  Sarkesian lists the system's 
ingredients, but his focus is so narrow that a disagreement about those ingredients is 
apparent.  He does not discuss some aspects of foreign policy development that others 
deem important to the process.  Furthermore, his view of the president as only a part of a 
larger system of foreign policy development and implementation only gets touched on 
rather than analyzed and, most important, his writings still place the emphasis and burden 
of foreign policy squarely on the shoulders of the president.  Presidents are usually 
judged as successes or failures based on how their personal actions and decisions affect 
the outcome of their administration’s foreign policies.  This emphasis on the personal 
dimension gives a distorted image of the presidency's true role.  The sum of the parts is 
equal to the whole, but the president is only one of the parts. 
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 The exact nature and dimensions of the system that includes the president but 
limits executive actions have not yet been established.  As noted earlier, this system has 
grown since the Eisenhower administration and presently plays the dominant role in 
determining foreign policy.  Five major components define this system:  the geopolitical 
situation, the actions of the prior administration, Congress, the election cycle, and the 
American domestic situation.  We may refer to the system as GPACED (Geopolitical 
Prior Administration Congress Election Domestic) to give it an identity.  Each 
component of GPACED is multifaceted and has the potential to exert a significant 
influence on foreign policy.  For instance, the domestic situation has confounded 
previous American diplomats who struggled to promote democratic principles abroad 
while simultaneously justifying the country's legalized racial discrimination to foreign 
emissaries. 
  This thesis will articulate the aspects of GPACED in concrete terms, elucidated 
by historical examples from the Eisenhower administration to the Carter administration 
that demonstrate how American commanders in chief are constrained and compelled.  
Identification of the GPACED will provide a foundation for the body of the work:  in-
depth discussions of its major components.  The objective is to demonstrate how 
GPACED itself dictates the direction and outcomes of national foreign policy. 
 GPACED affects all aspects of presidential authority.  Domestic initiatives, 
environmental policies, legal and justice reform, immigration, social initiatives, and 
economic policies are subject to the same pressures and constraints that GPACED 
imposes on foreign policy.  But the scope of this study focuses on a president’s ability to 
design, shape, and execute a foreign policy while fulfilling the duties of commander-in-
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chief within the system of GPACED.  In order to provide the reader with more recent 
and, therefore, familiar frames of reference, the explanation of GPACED in chapter two 
uses mostly post-Carter presidency examples.  The case studies then focus GPACED's 
effects on each administration from Eisenhower through Carter.       
 Although they often weight presidential influence too heavily, extant secondary 
sources have nevertheless proved the existence of GPACED by noting other influences 
on foreign policy success and failure.  Previously underemphasized primary sources 
demonstrate that presidents altered their foreign policies to accommodate GPACED.  For 
instance, audio recordings capture Nixon telling Kissinger not to withdraw American 
troops from Vietnam lest the South Vietnamese government collapse prior to the 1972 
U.S. presidential elections.  Previously unexplored primary sources also establish a new 
explanation for Eisenhower's loss of trust in CIA Director Allen Dulles.  And although 
most of the primary sources cited on the following pages are not unique to this work, 
other authors including those previously mentioned have overwhelmingly credited 
presidents with the successes and failures that occurred during their respective watches. 
  This thesis challenges that dominant historiographical paradigm; one that has 
become a common public perception.  That perception not only holds the commander in 
chief responsible, which it should, but accountable and liable; a much more debatable 
stance when so many factors remain beyond his control.  Presidents -- not legislatures -- 
get hanged or burnt in effigy, and popular perception often influences historiography 
whether professional historians care to admit it or not.  Would that all causes of a foreign 
policy disaster attract the wrath of protesters and the criticism of historians more fairly.  
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Even if not a panacea, an understanding of GPACED is bound to put our presidents in a 


















 Arguments against systemic constraints on presidential foreign policies can be 
found in analyses of presidential use of military forces.  Ryan C. Hendrickson contends 
that Congress has neglected its authority to approve the use of the nation’s military for 
combat operations and that Congress -- not the president -- has the power to decide as a 
body when to use military force.   He further argues that a clear pattern of congressional 
deference to presidential authority is due to political partisanship among members of 
Congress.1  In  Presidents of War (2018), Michael Beschloss also argues that presidents 
have disrupted the Founders' plan, seizing the authority to launch conflicts on their own 
without consulting Congress.2  Hendrickson and Beschloss make compelling arguments, 
but neither considers the impact of term limits on a president’s ability to exercise control 
over foreign policy.  Ratified in 1951, the Twenty-second Amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibits presidents from being elected to that office more than 
 
1 Ryan C. Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers. 1st ed. 
Nashville: (Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), xiii. 
2 Michael Beschloss, Presidents of War (New York: Crown, 2018), viii. 
11 
 
twice.3  Thus, election cycles since Eisenhower first took office in 1953 have often 
exerted more significant constraints on national foreign policy than before.  Were 
presidential powers truly imperial, as Hunt proposes, presidents would do as they pleased 
with unlimited resources to achieve their goals.  Some might construe notable foreign 
policy actions, such as Kennedy’s "quarantine" of Cuba, Nixon’s incursions into Laos 
and Cambodia, Reagan’s dealings with the Iranians and Contras, or Bush’s invasion of 
Panama as unilateral executive decisions made by a commander-in-chief with king-like 
powers.  However, these decisions were constrained acts, each president having to 
contend with the will of an electorate whose position had been strengthened by term 
limits and expressed through the decisions of their elected representatives.  A “Lame 
Duck” administration does not wield king-like authorities.  Instead, term limits help 
define the parameters of GPACED by marking the start and end of a president’s 
participation in the system.  In the end, U.S. presidents are locked into a system that 
determines foreign policy possibilities and outcomes. 
 The first part of GPACED is geopolitics, an analysis of the geographic influences 
on power relationships in international relations.4  Contemporary use of the term is 
generally in reference to international relations.  With respect to GPACED, geopolitical 
encompasses the world situation at large, including all events that affect United States 
foreign policy.  These include but are not limited to intentional actions, economic 
conditions, natural disasters and industrial accidents.  Although identified as part of the 
 
3 Wikipedia. “Twenty-second Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-second_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution 
 




GPACED system, the geopolitical situation can be considered an environmental factor.  
Much like the weather, geopolitical conditions can be projected with varying degrees of 
accuracy.  But although measures can be taken to mitigate anticipated circumstances, 
some events can remain beyond a president’s control as if he were caught outside in an 
un-forecasted downpour without an umbrella.  International settings for United States 
national security can present five dangers:  (a) they are contradictory and complex, (b) 
they may be ill-defined and irrational, (c) they may develop quickly with little time for 
understanding and analysis, (d) policies may require secrecy and covert operations, and 
(e) international actors may have more freedom of action than Americans to move 
quickly and conduct covert actions.  Not needing the support of either government or 
governed often works to their advantage.5 
 Any international happening that bears significantly on United States foreign 
relations is part of this system.  The geopolitical situation presents extra challenges for 
American presidents, as America is in perpetual competition with the world.  Most 
nations reasonably pursue policies that are in their own best interests.  Not only do those 
policies often conflict or compete with United States foreign policy goals, but it is 
common practice for some nation-states to obscure their objectives – think national 
secrets – and methods to shield their efforts from other nations’ reprisals or 
counterefforts.  Even with capable intelligence assets, many an American president has 
been thoroughly surprised with a sudden change in the geopolitical environment.  India’s 
successful second detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1998, which prompted neighboring 
 
5 Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 17-18. 
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Pakistan to detonate its own nuclear weapon a few weeks later, was a shock to the 
Clinton administration.6  The South Asian political landscape was drastically altered as 
two bitter rivals habitually at war over border disputes suddenly developed a capacity for 
mass destruction. 
 The geopolitical situation does not respect term limits.  On occasion, other 
governments take advantage of American election cycles.  For example, the Trump 
administration is struggling to achieve a trade deal with China.  As Trump’s term in 
office nears its end, international political analyst Reva Goujon judges that China is 
waiting for a change of administrations before making any lasting trade agreements with 
the United States.7  World events can also generate domestic support for American action 
or intervention.  Presidents can be compelled to react or face political consequences if 
they do not take action to mitigate the impact of sudden foreign political upheaval or 
environmental disaster.  George Friedman aptly describes the geopolitical environment, 
arguing that a president's foreign policy is a function of the situation in which he finds 
himself and that those situations, rather than presidential will, dictate foreign policy 
decisions.8  Presidential reactions to unforeseen world events and the rest of the system of 
GPACED can also have lasting implications beyond the present administration, just as 
prior administration actions affect the current administration.    
 
6
 Richard A. Best, Jr., "U.S. Intelligence and India’s Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned," Every 
CRSReport.com 98, no. 672 (August 1998): 2. 
7 Reva Goujon, “US Adversaries and Allies: Start the Countdown to 2020” Stratfor Worldview, 
June 22, 2019.  https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-adversaries-and-allies-start-countdown-2020-
presidential-election-iran-china-russia-north-korea-eu-japan-mexico-israel-poland Accessed 4 September 
2019 




 One of President Clinton’s first term challenges was the fallout from the 
“Blackhawk Down” incident in Somalia.  Clinton pulled the United States out of Somalia 
when eighteen American servicemen were killed in a fight with Somali warlord 
militiamen.9  But Clinton had not chosen to deploy America’s military to Somalia in the 
first place -- that decision was made during the final year of George H.W. Bush's 
administration.  The geopolitical environment – part of the system – set conditions that 
pressured Bush to ameliorate the human tragedy brought on by drought, famine, civil war 
and lawlessness in Somalia -- even if he had to deploy troops.10  Those troops were still 
in place when Clinton took over as commander-in-chief, so the system also compelled 
him to deal with a foreign policy issue not of his choosing.   
 But even without troops deployed in overseas combat situations, prior 
administrations leave a host of foreign policy constraints and limitations for incoming 
presidents.  Previous resource and planning allocations matter as well.  Any foreign 
policy goals or visons are tempered by the previous administration's accomplishments.  
Defenses budgets, foreign aid allocations, weapons procurement, military personnel 
strength, prior diplomatic engagement with nation states, foreign territory usage, and 
basing rights are but a few of the factors that weigh heavily on subsequent 
administrations.  The Department of Defense arranges for security cooperation programs 
that partner United States military forces in training and exchanges with foreign 
militaries.  The Department of State conducts security assistance programs that help 
 
9 Stephen Sestanovich, Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2014), 260. 
10 Robert F. Bauman, and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, My Clan Against the 
World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute 
Press, 2004), 23.   
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provide foreign governments military infrastructure, and financial/economic incentives.  
Both programs can take months and years of planning before an agreement to carry out 
the exchanges and activities ever goes into effect.  Providing the resources for these 
activities is a complicated, ponderous process that is difficult to reverse once put in 
motion.  Decisions made by presidents and supported by Congress set limits and 
constraints that can last for multiple presidential terms.  Consider the current process for 
developing the national security strategy.  The Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandates a methodical approach for the 
development of national security strategy, and requires the executive branch to produce a 
written plan that identifies America’s national interests.11 
 The president’s published national security strategy relies heavily on America’s 
military element of power to set in motion a series of actions that dictate America’s 
worldwide military posture.  The size of the military, the type of forces it generates, 
where those forces are based, its missions, and the skill sets of its members all hinge on 
the resources allocated by Congress to accomplish the approved security strategy.  Once 
the resources are provided, the Department of Defense adjusts its forces to comply with 
the national security strategy.  In some instances, minor adjustments suffice, but in most 
cases, significant effort is involved, entailing lengthy, time-consuming actions to build, 
prepare, and posture the force. 
 Figure 1 (below) illustrates the bureaucratic complexity of developing and 
resourcing the military to meet the requirements of the national security strategy.  
 
11 Steven Heffington, Adam Oler, and David Tretle Eds. A National Security Strategy Primer, 




Consider the time span between the various documents that guide development and use 
of forces.   
 
The national military strategy published in 2016 leads, in part, to a guide for the potential 
type of, and use of those forces needed in 2020.  The Purple Pipeline illustrates the 
relationship between national strategic guidance to planning and employing forces.12  
This four-year planning time span depicted in Figure 1 clearly illustrates how the current 
administration’s actions build the military used by future presidents.  However, despite 
 
12 Brian Allen, Lesson Plan for C204, Joint Planning Systems (Ft. Leavenworth: CGSC, 2019), 1-
4.   
 
 
Figure 1. Purple Pipeline Strategic Planning 
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this planning process, the president’s national security strategies are not necessarily 
provided enough resources to accomplish their objectives.  Congress often demonstrates 
that Bulwer-Lytton was right about the pen being mightier than the sword, by either 
providing far less funding than the president’s national security strategy requires or none 
altogether.  Under such conditions, applying that strategy might be difficult, if not 
impossible.  This procedure continues to evolve with each new administration.  While 
this exact process did not exist during Eisenhower’s administration, similar mechanisms 
exerted the same constraints on his and all subsequent administrations.    
 The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2020 has yet to become law.  
This act is the primary legislation that will provide resources to carry out the national 
security strategy.  In its current form, the bill contains provisions that would force 
President Trump to remove troops from Yemen and end support for the Saudi-backed 
forces there.  It would also prohibit the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey.13  Both 
these provisions would prevent the Trump administration from executing aspects of its 
current foreign policy.  Another challenge to Trump’s defense appropriations legislation 
is an amendment, passed by the House of Representatives, calling for a formal 
investigation into allegations that secret military biological weapons experiments 
unleashed weaponized ticks that spread Lyme Disease to the American public.14  At the 
 
13
 Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020, 116th Cong., 1st sess., 




 Lia Eustachewich, “House Orders Pentagon to Reveal if it Turned Ticks into Biological 
Weapons,” New York Post, (New York) July 17, 2019.  https://nypost.com/2019/07/17/house-orders-
pentagon-to-reveal-if-it-turned-ticks-into-biological-weapons/.   
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very least, this amendment will delay the passage of the Defense Appropriations Act, 
adding more uncertainty and friction to the process of funding the military. 
 Further complicating passage of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 
2020 is an additional provision that repeals the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force law.  These provisions require removal of troops used under the 2001 law after 240 
days of deployment.  The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Bill is an open-
ended authorization for presidents to deploy military forces against any entity associated 
with the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against the United States.15  This law has been 
invoked several times to authorize military operations in support of their presidential 
policies.  Repeated attempts at repeal are examples of Congress, as part of the GPACED 
system, wielding significant power and asserting its authority over the executive branch. 
 America’s military often dominates other elements of national power, but 
diplomacy is also essential to the success of presidential foreign policy.  Diplomatic 
measures carried out by the Department of State, although less expensive than "big stick" 
military budgets, are also subject to GPACED.  Congress uses its powers to influence or 
even dominate United States foreign policy.  In 1955, Eisenhower’s secretary of state, 
John Foster Dulles, withdrew offers to support construction of Egypt's Aswan High Dam 
when faced with pressure from Congress.  Backed by cotton industry lobbyists, southern 
Democratic congressmen were opposing support for the dam even before Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded American recognition of the People's Republic 
of China, and it was Congressional opposition that convinced Dulles to recommend 
 
15 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Statutes at Large 115, sec. 224 and 225 (2001).  
https://www.congress. gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-joint resolution/23?q=%7B %22search%22%3A% 
222001+Authorization +for+Use+of+Military+Force%22%7D&s=4&r=18.   
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withdrawal of funding.16  This incident contributed to Egypt joining the Soviet sphere of 
influence, thus complicating Eisenhower’s Middle East foreign policy. 
 Some congressmen attempt to take matters of foreign policy into their own hands 
by talking directly to foreign governments without Executive Branch consent.17  Former 
secretary of state, Democratic presidential candidate, and senator John Kerry (D-MA) 
admitted to conducting unsanctioned diplomatic talks with Iran, advising the Iranians to 
pursue other options while openly criticizing Trump’s foreign policy.18  As a senator 
during the Reagan administration, Kerry participated in another unsanctioned diplomatic 
mission when he and Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), both from the opposition party, 
traveled to Nicaragua to negotiate a deal with the Sandinistas that conflicted with 
Reagan’s foreign policy.19  In speaking about this trip, Kerry clearly attempted to dictate 
American foreign policy, and the Reagan administration's response showed the disruption 
Kerry had caused.  Said Kerry, “Senator Harkin and I are going to Nicaragua as Vietnam-
era veterans who are alarmed that the Reagan administration is repeating the mistakes we 
made in Vietnam.  Our foreign policy should represent the democratic values that have 
made our country great, not subvert those values by funding terrorism to overthrow 
governments of other countries.”  Secretary of State George Shultz decried these “self-
appointed emissaries to the Communist regime” in Managua, complaining that he could 
 
16 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 675. 
17
 Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 129. 
18Lia Eustachewich, “Kerry Admits to Meeting Iranian Officials over Nuclear Deal,” New York 
Post (New York) date of article.  
19Wikipedia. “John Kerry United States Senate (1985-2013).” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_ 
Kerry# United _States _Senate_(1985–2013) 
20 
 
not "conduct a successful policy when [such people] take trips or write ‘Dear 
Comandante’ letters with the aim of negotiating.”  Former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger added that “[i]f the Nicaraguans want to make an offer, they ought to make it 
through diplomatic channels.  We can’t be negotiating with our own congressmen and 
Nicaragua simultaneously.20” 
 Congress can also pass laws designed precisely to thwart presidential foreign 
policy actions.  Some of these laws are aimed at specific policies, and generally only 
affect the current administration.  The 1984 Boland Amendment expressly prohibited any 
funding of military or para-military activities in Nicaragua, thereby crippling Reagan’s 
efforts to aid the Contra rebels.  Faced with a choice of obeying Congressional will or 
helping the Contras, Reagan chose the latter, leading his administration into the Iran-
Contra scandal.21  Congress also has the power to create laws that have long-term foreign 
policy implications for future presidents.  The War Powers Resolution of 1973 remains a 
source of congressional-executive friction.  This legislation was passed by Congress 
during the Nixon administration to prevent future presidents from deploying military 
forces without consultation.  It places limits on what a president may do with military 
forces by requiring the president to seek congressional approval for the employment of 
force. 
 The 1973 law stipulates three circumstances in which the president can use 
military force:  a declaration of war by Congress, statutory approval from Congress, or a 
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national emergency in which U.S. territories or possessions are attacked.  Any use of 
force or deployment of forces equipped for combat into the territory, waters or airspace 
of a foreign nation falls under the purview of the War Powers Resolution.  Section 3 of 
the law further specifies that presidents must consult with Congress before and after 
troops are introduced into combat, and that presidents must report any use of force within 
48 hours.  There is also a time limit:  presidents have 60 days after notifying Congress 
with a 30-day extension possible to gain Congressional agreement.  If congressional 
consent is not given, the president must recall forces and cease hostilities.22  
 Hendrickson, Beschloss, and others assert that Congress neither exercises its full 
authority nor holds presidents accountable to the War Powers Resolution and that 
presidents regularly violate the law when deploying military forces in support of their 
foreign policies.  Such opinions elevate presidential authority above the constraints of 
GPACED but, as we have seen, a president cannot deploy and sustain forces without the 
resources that Congress provides.  Congress has also enacted subsequent legislation that 
prohibits presidents from carrying out desired foreign policy courses of action.  
Convincing arguments support the effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution in 
controlling the deployment of America’s military forces.  One contends that the War 
Powers Resolution's mere existence alters presidential behavior, thereby meeting the 
intent of the resolution.  This opinion also accounts for perceived congressional inaction.  
David P. Auerswald, and Peter F. Cowhey argue that the War Powers Resolution does 
meet the intent of the law.  “Congress rarely uses the Act not because of collective action 
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problems or electoral fears, but rather because presidents tailor their behavior to abide by 
the Act's provisions, thus avoiding a series of constitutional battles over the use of force 
that would benefit neither branch of government.23”   By rule of law, Congress holds 
sway over the executive branch both legally and fiscally.  Not only can Congress 
withhold funding for a president's favored foreign policy but it can also force the 
president to execute specific foreign policies that he does not support. 
 Congress can also influence or prevent presidents from conducting covert 
operations in support of foreign policy goals.  Administrations use covert operations and 
secret military deployments to achieve objectives and set conditions that conventional 
military deployments and diplomacy cannot, but such operations often create controversy 
between Congress and the executive branch.  Although the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) has been accountable to Congress since its inception, the Intelligence Oversight 
Act of 1980 added reporting requirements to better keep select committees of Congress in 
the loop.  When committee members object to a covert operation, they hold talks with the 
administration to stop or alter it.  When these disagreements cannot be resolved, 
Congressmen often add pressure by "leaking" classified information to the media either 
in or out of context.  This illegal dissemination of classified information by legislators is 
usually enough to enforce the congressional majority's will.24 
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 As a body, Congress typically reflects the political leanings of the general 
population, and presidents must contend with the political makeup of both houses.  While 
it is an advantage for the president’s party to hold majorities in both the House and the 
Senate, presidents rarely enjoy an uninterrupted two-house majority.  George H.W. 
Bush’s party held the House but was in the minority in the Senate, a political split that 
doomed fifty percent of administration-supported legislation to defeat.  By his fourth 
year, that figure dipped to forty percent.  Even when presidents enjoy a two-house 
majority, they often suffer declining Congressional support towards the end of their 
terms; Barack Obama’s legislative success declined during the 111th Congress even 
though the Democrats controlled both houses.  George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. 
Bush and Obama all garnered less support from Congress towards the end of their terms 
in office.25  Post-World War II presidents who served two terms all saw declines in 
Congressional support towards the end of their first terms, even though their reelection 
bids were successful.  This demonstrates the negative impact of the election cycle on 
presidential initiatives that include foreign policy. 
 America’s elected politicians are beholden to their constituents.  Although 
presidential terms are four years, each president must campaign every two years to 
support his party’s congressional election efforts as well.  At best, this election cycle 
distracts the president from foreign policy efforts.  At their worst, elections can alter 
foreign policy for the sake of garnering public support; presidents who trail in the polls 
sometimes adopt a popular foreign policy even though they disagree with it.  Similarly, 
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Congress sways toward a president’s preference if the voters support it, and away from a 
president’s preference if the voters oppose it.26 
 How the Commander-in-Chief of America’s armed forces, and the chief executive 
responsible for U.S. foreign policy gains those positions is crucial.  Elections are as much 
a part of GPACED as any other factor, as presidents ultimately answer to the voting 
citizen. That citizen, in turn, is accountable for the person he or she chooses to lead 
national foreign policy.  Presidents simply may not act in any way they see fit without 
support from the nation's elected representatives.  To do so is to risk punishment by 
Congress. 
 Elections allow America to either support a president, by voting for the 
representatives who support presidential policies in the Congressional elections, or reject 
a president by choosing Congressional representatives who oppose presidential policies.  
The election cycle also provides resiliency in recovering from mistakes.  A new president 
can rapidly reverse the problems of the previous administration, but the system can also 
make it hard to develop and manage strategies since current administrations must work 
within the resource limits provided by previous ones.  Most importantly, those 
responsible for developing and executing foreign policies do not control all of the assets 
needed to accomplish the strategies.  The American political system of elections 
influences national security development.  Because the system is open to the public, the 
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people's will gives legitimacy to decisions.27  Policy approval's very public nature can 
also benefit national adversaries who try to use the American political system to thwart 
actions that work to their disadvantage.  The influence of the public on the system ties a 
president’s success or failure to the American domestic situation. 
 The domestic component to GPACED -- the situation in America and American 
society -- is the home equivalent of the geopolitical situation discussed earlier.  
Purposeful man-made events, economic factors, mass calamity due to natural disaster or 
industrial-scale accidents, and any events or conditions that sway public opinion are also 
environmental factors.  America’s prosperity is key.  A poor economy means fewer 
resources available for foreign policy support, and less opportunity for the average 
citizen; high unemployment can turn the voter against a president even though his foreign 
policy is a success.  The success of a policy can also have more to do with the attitudes 
and personalities of the political leadership than any formal political process.28   
 Scandals involving presidents are a common occurrence in many administrations.  
During the Korean Police Action, a war that was not well supported by the American 
public, Truman dealt with charges of being soft on communism and sheltering 
communist sympathizers within his administration.29  President Trump has been dogged 
by accusations that he colluded with Russia to sway the result of the general election in 
his favor.  These scandals can seriously detract from a president’s ability to conduct 
foreign policy.  Allegations of illicit behavior are also political weapons against sitting 
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administrations because presidential administrations can expend considerable time and 
resources when refuting accusations and containing damage.  Scandals contribute to the 
general public's perception of the president, a figure who must sustain rapport with the 
public to be effective.  The primary means of presidential communication with the 
general population is through the media.   
 The role of the media as the chief means of executive branch communication 
complicates the relationship between the president and the people.  The media can be an 
asset to a president or a liability.  In addition to serving as a source of information to the 
public, it is very much a component of the political landscape with its own agendas, some 
of which support or oppose foreign policy and national security strategies.  Opinion polls 
whose results are shaped by a largely uninformed public often compound that public 
ignorance by oversimplifying the issues.  The political affiliation of a president can also 
be an asset or a liability, as leading media professionals are statistically proven to hold 
liberal ideologies and most often align their organizations with Democratic party 
agendas.30  Political affiliation can also align with or pit presidents against interest 
groups.  Interest groups have specific agendas and often couple with the media to 
promote or refute foreign policy actions.  Working for powerful organizations, supported 
by lobbies, interest groups influence key members of Congress and seek to gain the 
support of the general public in achieving their agendas.   
 The domestic situation can be the deciding factor in the success or failure of 
foreign policy.  A hurricane, riot, stock market crash, or revelation of hush-money 
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payments to a porn star can all have the potential to disrupt or altogether thwart 
presidential foreign policy actions.  Each facet of GPACED alone can derail policies, but 
the limitations and effects of GPACED can be especially difficult to overcome when 
combined.  Some administrations succumb to the effects and have major foreign policy 
failures.  Other administrations, whose president and key advisors are knowledgeable and 
experienced, can mitigate the impacts of GPACED.  How presidents are equipped to deal 
with the system plays a role in their foreign policy success or failure.   
 The president’s personal foreign policy qualifications, those of his advisors, how 
he organizes them, and the decisions he makes are all crucial aspects.  The system largely 
decides the first aspect, and not all presidents are elected for their foreign policy 
expertise.  What the president has personally brought to the office in terms of foreign 
policy and organizational knowledge varies widely.  Americans elected George H. W. 
Bush, who arguably had one of the best foreign policy resumes.  The United States also 
elected Donald Trump, whose background suggests that he was largely ignorant of 
foreign policy matters and government organization before he took office -- not the first 
presidential foreign policy rookie by any means.  But regardless of individual 
qualifications, it is highly unlikely that any president can be cognizant of and fully 
competent in the entirety of the vast, complex system of foreign policy.  Presidents 
compensate for a lack of personal experience and knowledge of foreign policy by 
selecting key personnel to provide advice and counsel.  Selecting the best people to fill 
these roles, and knowing when to replace them if they are not achieving the desired 
results are critical decisions.    
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 The second aspect is the selection of advisors, a process influenced by the system 
as well.  The National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendments created the 
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the 
CIA.  This Act intended that the principal advisors for national security reside in the 
National Security Council.  All the statutory members of the National Security Council 
are civilians.31  The president may select those individuals who provide principal advice 
through the National Security Council, but the statutory members of the National 
Security Council are confirmed by the Senate, which exposes the president to the 
influence, or partisanship of Congress.  This is where GPACED can influence the 
selection of key personnel, for some are chosen for their political affiliations versus their 
suitability for the job.  Although not required by law, the National Security Council 
includes an Assistant for National Security Affairs, commonly referred to as the National 
Security Advisor, who serves as the president’s chief advisor on national security.  Since 
Congress does not control this position, the president is free to choose a National Security 
Advisor who is like-minded and supportive of the administration’s foreign policy 
philosophies.   
 The third consideration is how presidents organize their foreign policy teams.  
The president can empower the National Security Advisor to do this, elevating him nearly 
to the rank of statutory cabinet member.  Some presidents minimize the role of the 
National Security Council, while others rely heavily on it.  Primary National Security 
Council members each have their own separate power bases.  As a body, the NSC can 
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formulate its own policy options or oppose other courses of action, but it does not have 
an operational arm to execute any options on its own.  Conversely, the State and Defense 
Departments, and sometimes the CIA, have all the resources to implement foreign 
policies budgeted by Congress.  These power relationship dynamics make for a 
challenging command and control situation.  The effectiveness of the National Security 
Advisor can be crucial in coordinating the implementation of administration foreign 
policies.   
 The national security advisor along with the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of State form a triad of foreign policy development and execution for the 
president.  The powers and relationships of these three key positions are critical to the 
president for shaping the security strategy.  The Department of State operates with 
traditional diplomacy that focuses on negotiations and compromise.  The State 
Department normally runs primary diplomatic exchanges.  This department is very 
bureaucratic and somewhat entrenched in its methods and philosophical approaches to 
foreign policy.  Department of State personnel can be obstinate, reticent and difficult for 
some administrations to control.  The Department of Defense tends to lean towards 
military responses.  Presidential responsibilities as commander-in-chief are usually 
exercised through the Defense Department.  It is not unusual for State and Defense to 
work at cross purposes, which harms foreign policy efforts.  The president’s National 
Security Advisor ideally deconflicts and synchronizes foreign policy efforts between 
State and Defense.32  However, presidents do not always rely on this triad to formulate 
 
32 Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 73-83. 
30 
 
and execute foreign policy.  Regardless of who presidents depend on, choosing the 
“right” people for these critical positions, and how an administration organizes its foreign 
policy teams are among the most important decisions a president can make before 
assuming office.   
 This brings us to the fourth consideration, which is the foreign policy decisions 
the president makes while in office.  Ostensibly, this consideration should carry the most 
culpability for presidents, as they selected the courses of action.  But, as we shall see, 
GPACED often imposes severe restrictions on a president’s freedom of action.  If a 
president is forced to choose a bad course of action that is neither appropriate nor suitable 
to the task but politically feasible or demanded, who is responsible for the outcome of 
that task?  Is the execution of this bad foreign policy the fault of the president or is it the 
fault of GPACED, which forced the president’s hand?    
 Personal experience, selecting key personnel, organizing to develop, and execute 
foreign policy, and the foreign policy decisions made during their time in office are 
within the purview of the president.  A president who rates highly in these four areas has 
an advantage over those less qualified and not as adept at organizing.  But GPACED does 
not discriminate -- it affects each administration.   
 The concept of GPACED can be used to paint a picture of the significant foreign 
policy events of every president.  This graphic is a visual summary of the key events of 
each administration, where those events align with GPACED, and how GPACED 
influenced the foreign policies of the administrations.  This depiction is not a scientific, 
statistical instrument; rather, it is a visual representation of the subjective assessments of 
GPACED and its influences on American foreign policy. 
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 The constant, or reference line, for this visual is defined by what the president 
intended to achieve with their administration’s foreign policy.  This goal occupies the 
center of the chart in Figure 2 below, forming the baseline.  Foreign policy events that 
generally conform to the administration’s desired goals are depicted along this baseline.  
When GPACED prevents a goal from being achieved, meaning little change occurs, the 
event or condition is displayed below the baseline.  When GPACED compels foreign 
policy actions that are generally opposite of the president’s foreign policy goals, the 
forcing event or condition is displayed above the baseline.  The dominant element(s) of 
GPACED that prevent or compel foreign policy, as represented by their corresponding 
letters to the acronym, are indicated next to each event.  
 The example provided here uses President Trump’s current administration to 
illustrate a graphic depiction of the apparent impact of GPACED on his administration’s 
foreign policy.  The understanding, of course, is that Trump’s administration is not 
complete at the time of these writings, and has yet to be properly analyzed and assessed 
from a historical perspective.   
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For the purpose of this sample visualization of the Trump administration, we use George 
Freidman’s assessment of Trump’s foreign policy.  Friedman judges Trump’s foreign 
policy goals as seeking to defuse situations that might require military actions, instead of 
engaging in an offensive foreign economic policy, while disregarding opinions from 
abroad in the broadest sense.33  Note that foreign polices evolve throughout every 
administration; for the purpose of this example, Trump’s foreign policy goals remain 
constant.  At a glance, this visualization shows the extent to which Trump is either 
compelled or restrained from accomplishing his stated foreign policy goals.  The 
geopolitical environment and Congress appear to be the dominant factors in Trump’s 
foreign policy achievements.      
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 The following chapters are an analysis of GPACED's impacts on the key foreign 
policy actions of presidential administrations from Eisenhower to Carter.  Discussions of 
individual administration foreign policies are not exhaustive; the emphasis is on well-
known primary events.  Each administration is viewed from the perspective of the 
elements of GPACED.  Following the analysis, the administrations are summarized with 
a graphic representation that effectively displays the influence of GPACED on the 
















































 Case study analysis begins with Eisenhower’s presidency because his 
administration embraced the intent of the National Security Act of 1947 by developing 
and implementing procedures that employed the National Security Council structure.  
While the National Security Council continued to evolve with subsequent 
administrations, vestiges of Eisenhower’s construct are reflected in every one of them 
and are a consistent part of foreign policy making.  Eisenhower was uniquely qualified to 
serve as president during the time of his administration.  Few had his leadership 
experience on the world stage.  He had a firm grasp of America’s standing and its 
relationships in the international community.  General Eisenhower commanded armies 
alongside the world’s leaders on the grand theater of the World War Two battlefields.  As 
president, he continued this association with many of these same international leaders.  
He also faced some of his former allies as international competitors and adversaries, and 
his personal knowledge and insight into the personalities of these world leaders were a 
unique asset to his administration’s foreign policy efforts.  Another exceptional personal 
aspect of Eisenhower, a feature that further sets him apart from all his presidential peers, 
is that his motivations for holding the office of the President of the United States appear 
to be truly altruistic.  He did not seek office and was not a career politician.  In 1952 he 
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agreed to represent the Republicans after they aggressively sought him out and pressured 
him to run as their presidential candidate.  President Eisenhower continued to 
demonstrate this altruism during the Suez Canal incident, which occurred on the eve of 
the election for his second term.  Counseled not to risk alienating Jewish voters by 
publicly going against Israel, the president stated that he did not care about the election.34  
He based his decision on the merits of the situation rather than the influence of the 
American voter. 
 Accustomed to grim decisions and working with senior Allied military leaders 
and heads of state, Eisenhower remarked on his first day in office that he had “[p]lenty of 
worries and difficult problems.  But such has been my portion for a long time…the result 
is that this just seems (today) like a continuation of all I’ve been doing since July 
1941…even before that.”  His leadership experience at the military and national level 
made him more qualified to serve as commander-in-chief than any of his contemporary 
peers. 
 Eisenhower’s key foreign policy advisor was Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles.  Although illness forced him to resign near the end of Eisenhower’s final term in 
office, Dulles exerted a major influence on foreign policy.  Dulles had a pedigree for his 
job and previous experience with international politics, his grandfather and uncle having 
served as secretaries of state for presidents Harrison and Wilson.  As a young man, he 
participated in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.  Dulles’ experience, like-minded 
views of America’s role in the international community, and close friendship with 
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Eisenhower made him an ideal foreign policy advisor.35  Two other advisors that 
Eisenhower relied heavily on were Robert Cutler, his special assistant for national 
security affairs, and CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, the secretary of state's brother.  
Eisenhower’s relationship with Allen Dulles proved to be a much more challenging 
association.  Even though exceptionally qualified, Dulles did not always use the freedom 
of action allowed by Eisenhower wisely and significant problems resulted.  With his 
extensive military background, the president preferred to keep his military advisors at 
arm’s length, also troublesome for Eisenhower because his three successive secretaries of 
defense were ineffective.36    
 The administration was well organized and had an efficient foreign policy 
planning process.  Upon entering office, Eisenhower instituted a military-like staff 
process of routine national security planning sessions, with Cutler an integral part of the 
National Security Council.  After participating in the NSC meetings for three months, 
Cutler codified the duties and responsibilities of the existing members, made 
recommended changes to the basic structure, and added permanent personnel to maintain 
an apolitical continuity to the staff functions of the council.  His role – the special 
assistant for national security affairs – ensured that the president’s views for policy-
planning were carried out.  He acted as executive officer at council meetings and presided 
over the planning board.37  Eisenhower attended National Security Council meetings on a 
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weekly basis and, in addition to these weekly formal meetings, frequently met for 
informal conferences to discuss policy with key trusted advisors.  Using these gatherings 
as a forum for consideration of major foreign policy issues, he insisted his staff members 
present analyses of the issues to the security council in highly digested forms with 
options clearly distinguished.  Eisenhower relied on his staff to manage the details, 
preferring to focus on the bigger picture.  This allowed him to see each action in context, 
and how it related to his overall foreign policy.38     
 That foreign policy was a continuation of the Truman administration’s policy of 
containment -- containing the spread of America’s communist enemies rather than 
seeking their immediate destruction.39  Using his skills for organization and staff work, 
Eisenhower commissioned a long-term study group to develop his administration’s own 
version of this security strategy.  Called Project Solarium, these strategic planners 
developed three options to defend against the global communist threat.  When 
Eisenhower ordered the study, he clearly had military organization in mind; he instructed 
that “[t]he preparation should be as for a War College project, and might be done at the 
War College, utilizing also its top personnel and facilities.”40  The outcome of Project 
Solarium was the adoption of a National Security Council document that selected the 
preferred course of action.  NSC-162/2 called for a move away from reliance on large 
conventional forces and emphasis on the threat of nuclear retaliation instead.  Eisenhower 
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strongly believed that the United States should avoid getting sucked into wars like the 
one being fought in Korea when he took office.  At the same time, he sought to reduce 
the enormous amount of spending on military systems for national defense.  NSC 162/2 
also emphasized asymmetric responses such as covert operations, economic aid, and 
military assistance to those non-communist countries threatened by communist takeover.  
To empower an increase in covert operations, Eisenhower successfully gained approval 
of an additional National Security Council directive:  NSC-5412, a directive on covert 
operations that funneled economic and military aid directly to anti-communist groups 
without involving American military forces.41   
 The Eisenhower administration named this strategy the New Look, but its 
emphasis on the nuclear threat made it known to the world as Massive Retaliation.  When  
John Foster Dulles announced in a 1954 speech that the United States would rely on its 
retaliatory capacity to deter aggression however and wherever it chose, the Soviets and 
and Communist Chinese perceived a worst case:  nuclear counterstrikes aimed at their 
economic and political centers even in response to the most limited aggression.42  This 
New Look/Massive Retaliation strategy guided Eisenhower throughout both terms of his 
administration despite its potential for destabilization. 
 Considered in light of the U.S. presidency's foreign policy role, Eisenhower must 
be rated favorably.  His personal qualifications were ideal for the times -- he was 
experienced and understood the systems provided for foreign policy making.  Aside from 
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the three successive secretaries of defense, he selected knowledgeable, experienced, 
competent people to serve in key advisory positions and his talent for organization, 
command, and control enabled him to manage America’s foreign policy by adapting the 
existing structures and procedures to the environment that he faced.  Experienced key 
personnel complemented his administration, allowing him to deal with the complexities 
of foreign policy.  Even so, GPACED imposed itself on President Eisenhower and forced 
him away from his stated goals on several occasions. 
 One of the first challenges Eisenhower faced was ending the Korean conflict.  He 
even considered using nuclear weapons and leaking this possibility to the Chinese and 
Soviets.  To his credit, the July 1953 armistice might not have been possible without that 
threat.  In 1962, John F. Kennedy’s defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara, called on 
then former President Eisenhower for advice on Kennedy’s foreign policy in South East 
Asia.  When questioned on the issue of Chinese military assistance to the Viet Cong in 
South Vietnam, Eisenhower reminded McNamara of the measures he had taken to end 
the Korean War, especially his warnings to the Chinese that their territory north of the 
Yalu River would no longer be off  limits to American air power, and that he would not 
be limited in the weapons he used.43  This nuclear threat had proven a powerful 
diplomatic tool in convincing communist regimes to stop fighting.  On the other hand, it 
did not liberate anyone or reduce military spending in Korea.  Instead of honoring 
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campaign promises, he settled for the status quo, extending Truman’s version of 
containment.44   
 Eisenhower’s efforts to use asymmetric methods proved successful at first.  In 
Guatemala and Iran, his administration conducted low-cost, CIA-led operations that 
provided direction and funneled aid, arms, and financial support directly to anti-
communist political groups.  A June 1954 telegram from John Peurifoy, the American 
Ambassador to Guatemala, shows how the State Department cooperated with the CIA to 
set the conditions for the American-instigated coup there.  Peurifoy noted that the 
targeted Guatemalan regime had successfully lowered tensions in the country and was 
making political gains that strengthened its hold on power.  He further stated that if 
Eisenhower made a negative public statement about the situation and renounced a U.S.-
Guatemalan trade deal, the trend could be reversed.45  The Guatemalan and Iranian 
operations placed pro-Western leaders in control and kept two countries out of the 
communist sphere of influence quickly and quietly in support of Eisenhower’s foreign 
policy.46   
 In Vietnam, however, New Look containment failed and the communists gained 
control of North Vietnam.  America provided only material support for the French, 
leaving their conventional troops at home while the French struggled against the Viet 
Minh.  However, direct intervention had been considered in late December of 1953; 
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reinforcing the French with American military power was an option, as was replacing 
French troops should France quit the fight.  Each of these options contained both 
coalition and unilateral plans for U.S. military operations against the Viet Minh.47  
Eisenhower also considered supporting a deployment of Republic of Korea (ROK) troops 
to help the French, and Allen Dulles’ CIA thus assessed likely global reactions to such a 
plan.  In the CIA's report, Dulles predicted that South Korean troops would most 
certainly be viewed as proxies for America and possibly draw similar reactions from the 
larger communist powers.  He also concluded that the French and the British would 
oppose ROK intervention, particularly because it would show America's lack of 
confidence in French military capability and thus cause a blow to French national 
prestige.48 
 No South Korean troops deployed to Vietnam at that time and, even if they had,  
the decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu would have brought Eisenhower closer to 
intervening than before.  He did use the threat of nuclear arms to prevent Chinese 
intervention, but the Chinese provided the Vietminh with military equipment and supplies 
nevertheless -- support that was instrumental in their victory.49  The Geneva Accords of 
1954 were signed, withdrawing French troops from the region and establishing a cease-
fire and partition of Vietnam, ending the First Indochina War.  A progress report to 
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Eisenhower’s National Security Council summarized these agreements as “completing a 
major forward stride for communism which may lead to the loss of Southeast Asia.”50  
The United States refused to sign the agreement, and Eisenhower reacted to the 
establishment of a communist-controlled North Vietnam by creating the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO).  Otherwise, he reasoned, the “Domino Effect” would 
spread communism throughout the region.  Under SEATO, defense depended on Asian 
ground troops backed up by American airpower and military advisors.  It conformed to 
the New Look strategy by using less direct involvement and empowering anticommunist 
governments to fight communist takeover while American threats of retaliation kept the 
Chinese at bay.51 
 The passage of the Formosa Resolution in early 1955 again tested the New Look  
This resolution authorized Eisenhower to use the full range of military options should the 
Chinese attempt to seize Formosa and its adjacent islands, and he aimed his signing 
statement on this resolution squarely at China.  “We are ready to support a United 
Nations effort to end the present hostilities in the area" he declared, "but we also are 
united in our determination to defend an area vital to the security of the United States and 
the free world.”52  The resolution was the result of Communist Chinese attacks on 
offshore islands claimed by the Nationalist Chinese, Quemoy Island being the main bone 
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of contention.  Even after a large American show of force involving aircraft carriers and 
attack aviation positioned on Formosa, China continued to make overt moves to seize 
Quemoy.  Eisenhower resorted to another atomic threat during a March 16, 1955, press 
conference to deter the Communists Chinese.  The threat worked, and Communist China 
ceased hostilities.53 
 Meanwhile, Allen Dulles and the CIA acquired the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, 
providing Eisenhower with a lead over the Soviets in strategic intelligence gathering.  
This spy asset allowed him to see that America still had a sizable advantage in strategic 
weapons, despite a widely held public belief that the Soviets were far superior.  In 1956, 
the U-2 gathered information on the Soviets as they sent troops into Hungary to put down 
a revolution and discovered British, French, and Israeli troop buildups in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  At the heart of the latter crisis was a souring of Anglo-Egyptian relations 
after World War Two.  Heavy-handed actions by British troops defending the Suez Canal 
had inflamed Egyptian nationalists.  A 1936 treaty had authorized the British presence, 
but a British embargo on fuel oil to the Egyptians living in the canal zone and the cutoff 
of fuel supplies in retaliation for Egyptian interference with British trains caused Egypt to 
abrogate in October 1951.  Jefferson Caffery, American ambassador to Egypt, intervened 
and eased tensions a bit, but when American politicians withdrew United States offers to 
fund construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser nationalized the canal.54  Some wondered about American motives.  Remarking 
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on Democratic charges that the Republicans had pulled funding for the dam in order to 
weaken the Southern cotton industry's foreign competition, Alabama columnist Ray 
Tucker saw the move as a transparent effort to buy Southern votes.  It had released five 
million bales of American cotton onto the world market, he claimed.55   
 Meanwhile, the British concocted a scheme to regain control of the Suez Canal.  
While Israel attacked Egypt, Great Britain and France intervened under the guise of 
keeping this strategic waterway open to world commerce.  Nasser responded by blocking 
the canal with sunken ships, and Eisenhower’s administration publicly condemned the 
Anglo-French attack, using economic sanctions and an oil embargo to force England, 
France, and Israel to withdraw.  Both America and the Soviet Union supported a United 
Nations Security Council resolution condemning the attack on Egypt, but Eisenhower 
still warned the Soviets to stay out of the conflict and further elaborated on Nikita 
Khrushchev's threat of intervention in a post-presidency interview.  Eisenhower 
instructed Dulles to tell the Russians that the Americans would counteract anything they 
did; that even though he did not agree with the French and British, they were still 
America’s allies, and he would defend them.56  Both the Soviet Union and the United 
States began preparations for a general war over the incident.  American general 
preparedness for combat operations started October 29, 1956, when the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff prepared for a joint force deployment to the Mediterranean.57  In the end, the 1956 
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Suez Canal Incident destabilized an already volatile Middle East situation and moved 
Egypt closer to the Soviet sphere of influence.58 
 This destabilization caused Eisenhower to extend Truman’s policy of containment 
to the Middle East and, in what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, his 
administration successfully orchestrated passage of a Joint Resolution to Promote Peace 
and Stability in the Middle East.  This 1957 law authorized the president to cooperate 
with any Middle Eastern nation to promote and maintain their national independence.  
Economic programs and security/military assistance were authorized, as well as the 
deployment of American forces to protect these nations from communist aggression.59   
 In what many considered to be gunboat diplomacy, Eisenhower used this Middle 
East executive authority to keep the pro-Western King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan in 
power.  Although this new law gave the president broad authority, he still had to battle 
Congress for support of his objectives in Jordan.  During a telephone call in early 1957, 
Eisenhower discussed the negative impact on his Jordan policy, one that resulted from 
cuts in the State Department budget by the Senate Appropriations Committee.  Secretary 
of State Dulles countered that the president was constitutionally responsible for foreign 
policy, and that the Senate had made it impossible for the president to carry out his 
foreign policies in Jordan.60  When a comparable effort failed in Syria, Syria and Egypt 
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responded to America’s meddling by forming a pact – the United Arab Republic – with 
Soviet backing. 
 Eisenhower did succeed in preserving another Western-leaning government when 
he sent troops to Lebanon during the summer of 1958.  A telegram from the American 
ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, demonstrates the challenges of coordinating 
America’s diplomatic and military elements of national power.  As the American troops 
arrived, McClintock was trying to get the Lebanese army to maintain security in hopes 
that a civil war could be prevented, and left-leaning Arab nationalists held at bay.  The 
ambassador’s task was complicated because the military had provided very little 
information about their arrival in the country.  Meanwhile Lebanese army commander 
General Fouad Chehab was shocked to learn from McClintock that marines would soon 
be in the country.  Chehab told the ambassador that he needed time to convince his army 
to support the Americans.  “We are on the brink of catastrophe," he pleaded.  "There is a 
very thin chance we can avoid going over that brink provided your soldiers stay on board 
their ships.”  McClintock agreed with the Lebanese commander but was unable to get a 
message to the invasion force.61  The Marines came ashore the day before Chehab could 
speak with his army but, luckily, Lebanon remained aligned with the West.  Nevertheless, 
the Eisenhower Doctrine did not achieve all of its desired results.  The goodwill 
Eisenhower gained when he forced England and France to leave the Suez Canal was 
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offset by his gunboat diplomacy, which generated resentment and increased Arab 
nationalism.  The Soviets used this resentment to extend their influence in the region.62 
 While Eisenhower sought approval for his Middle East doctrine, the Soviets 
successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and placed a satellite in orbit 
around earth.  Sputnik caused much anxiety in the American public.  A White House 
study noted the consequent blow to American international prestige, citing several 
instances in which foreign governments might see the clear Soviet advantage in ballistic 
missile and space technologies as reason enough to act against American interests.63  This 
anxiety resulted in major pressure on the administration to increase defense and weapons 
production in order to catch up to a perceived Soviet lead in strategic weapons, and 
worked against Eisenhower’s pursuit of mutual disarmament.64   
 Coupled by the perceived Soviet strategic weapons superiority, Eisenhower's 
actions in Lebanon caused a response by the Communist Chinese, who resumed attacks 
on Quemoy, and blockaded the island.65  During a planning conference on this crisis, the 
president determined that an attack on Quemoy was equivalent to an attack on Formosa 
itself., citing the Formosa Resolution.  Eisenhower also decided that any United States 
military action to defend Formosa must include the use of atomic weapons on mainland 
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China.  The president considered Quemoy and other outlying islands to be militarily 
insignificant but judged their worth in terms of moral rather than military factors.66   
 With United States marines still in Lebanon, the president ordered the military to 
prepare for conventional and nuclear war against China.  American military assistance to 
Nationalist Chinese helped them cope with the blockade.  Dulles also issued a strongly 
worded statement that indicated the United States might use nuclear weapons if necessary 
to defend Quemoy if it was invaded.  Even though Eisenhower did not invoke the 
Formosa Resolution, which authorized him to use any force necessary to defend the 
Nationalist Chinese islands, China’s hopes for lack of American resolve ended with the 
secretary of state’s warnings.  The Chinese called for talks to settle the dispute, but 
continued their blockade.  Playing on the perceived strategic weapons gap between the 
United States and the Soviets, they coordinated with Moscow and arranged for the 
Soviets to send a message to the United States.  That message stated that any attack on 
the Chinese People’s Republic was an attack on the Soviet Union.  However, American 
assistance enabled the Nationalists to break the Communist Chinese blockade of 
Quemoy.  Ceasefire agreements followed and the crisis eventually subsided.  On the one 
hand, Eisenhower’s foreign policy again contained communist expansion.  On the other, 
his latest threat of nuclear retaliation had drawn a counter-threat from a peer power.  No 
longer would America be able to threaten without an equally great risk to itself.67    
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 Elsewhere, Eisenhower’s foreign policy efforts struggled.  His emphasis on 
asymmetric methods suffered a setback when a CIA plot to replace Indonesian leader 
Sukarno failed.  The CIA perceived that Sukarno was leaning towards the Soviet and 
Communist Chinese spheres of influence and orchestrated a coup to remove him.  The 
coup failed when Lawrence Allen Pope, a CIA pilot, was shot down by the Indonesians 
in May 1958.  Jailed and sentenced to death as a mercenary by the Indonesians, Pope was 
evidence of U.S. involvement in the failed coup, even though the Eisenhower 
administration maintained that he was a mercenary.  The misinformation worked; even 
after Pope's release in late 1962, American newspapers still referred to him as a soldier 
for hire.  One story dismissed his bombing of Indonesian forces as “the hazard and the 
romance of flying for hire in the Orient.”68  Instead of executing Pope, Sukarno used his 
captivity to leverage military assistance from the very nation that had sought his 
overthrow.69   
 The fallout from this failed coup created a rift between Eisenhower and CIA 
Director Allen Dulles.  The president began to shut out Dulles, formerly one of his key 
policy advisors, from planning sessions.70  The National Security Council meetings 
leading up to Pope’s capture provide some insight as to why this incident may have led to 
Eisenhower’s ire for the CIA Director.  During several discussions of the Indonesian civil 
war, Allen Dulles had commented on the rebels' need for military aircraft.  During one 
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NSC meeting, the president questioned the utility of providing airplanes to the rebels, 
who were operating in thick jungle terrain.  Director Dulles argued that airplanes could 
be used to attack Sukarno’s forces on the few roads in the area, but Eisenhower remained 
unconvinced that a few aircraft would significantly help the situation.  The president did 
feel that if a Communist takeover occurred in Indonesia, the United States would have to 
intervene militarily, but Pope’s capture scuttled his plans.  That the CIA pilot was 
captured flying a plane that Eisenhower thought unnecessary surely contributed to the 
personal rift with his CIA director.71   
  In late 1958, President Eisenhower’s policy collided with the Soviets when 
Khrushchev demanded that the West cede control of West Germany’s Berlin access to 
East Germany.  Khrushchev gave the West six months.  Advisors urged the president to 
build up conventional forces in Europe in preparation for the defense of West Berlin, but 
Eisenhower refused.  Secretary of State Dulles did acknowledge that America was ready 
to negotiate, but added that giving up West Berlin was not an option; a response that 
hinted at nuclear retaliation for any Soviet aggression.  The standoff ended with both 
sides agreeing and to hold a peace summit, preceded by mutual visits.  Khrushchev’s 
subsequent visit to Camp David was hailed by the public as a great success, easing 
tensions between the Soviets and America, bringing hopeful expectations for the 
upcoming Paris peace summit.72  Eisenhower’s nuclear deterrence succeeded again, only 
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this time not as an overt threat but simply because the capability was there.  The Soviets 
did not want to test Eisenhower’s resolve. 
 The Paris Peace Conference was anything but peaceful.  Two weeks before the 
conference began, the Soviets shot down a CIA U-2 spy plane over their territory.  
Eisenhower’s administration initially denied that the aircraft was on a spying mission, but 
soon accepted responsibility.  At the conference, the president agreed to suspend U-2 
flights over Soviet territory -- not much of a concession, as he had known for two years 
that American spy satellites would soon be operational.73  More infuriating to 
Khrushchev, Eisenhower he refused to apologize for the spy flight.  Fallout in other 
nations from the U-2 incident dogged the president’s administration.  Pakistan had 
provided bases for the American spy-plane missions into Russia on the condition that 
they remain secret, and a Pakistani diplomat was most displeased that the free American 
press had published maps showing the location of a U-2 base in his country.74  The 
opportunity for nuclear arms reduction and cooperation between the East and West was 
lost when the Soviets downed pilot Francis Gary Powers’ spy plane.   
 Military friction between America and the USSR increased after the U-2 was 
downed over Soviet territory.  One incident a few months later resulted in the capture of 
two additional American pilots.  The Russians attacked an American RB-47H spy plane 
operating in international airspace, bringing it down in waters outside of Soviet territory.  
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Most of the crew were killed, but the Soviets captured two surviving pilots.  The fact that 
the RB-47H was operating in an international area caused Eisenhower to consider direct 
retaliation to secure the release of the surviving crewmen.  The plan called for blocking 
Soviet air and maritime travel to United States and the deliberate downing of any Soviet 
military aircraft that flew within thirty miles of any United States territory.75    
 The tense relations between the Soviets and America were not the only issues 
Eisenhower faced.  The geopolitical environment remained an active challenge 
throughout Eisenhower’s presidency and, during his final year in office, he severed 
relations with Cuba.  Castro’s successful coup, which ousted the American-backed Cuban 
dictator Fulgencio Batista, jeopardized United States’ control of Guantanamo Bay and 
deprived many American businessmen from their holdings in Cuba.  Most troublesome 
was Castro’s trade agreement with the Soviet Union.  These developments put in motion 
a CIA plan to overthrow the Marxist leader of the island nation.76  
 The prior administration's influence was also significant.  Eisenhower had 
inherited Containment and with it the Korean police action from Truman, but the Truman 
administration’s NSC-68 (April 1950) yielded far-reaching ramifications, too.  It 
reinforced Containment as the overarching foreign policy by calling for a dramatic 
increase in military funding; by 1953, Eisenhower’s first year in office, defense spending 
tripled.77  Having inherited both hot and cold wars against the spread of communism, 
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Eisenhower also intended to save the American economy by reducing military spending.  
He was passionate about bringing a change in the international climate that allowed for a 
universal arms reduction and feared costly war preparedness as much as he feared all-out 
war itself.  In his 1953 “Chance for Peace” speech to the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors, Eisenhower warned that  “[t]his world in arms is not spending money alone.  It is 
spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.”78  
Yet two years into his presidency, the international climate compelled him to continue 
spending the bulk of America’s national income on defense.  Eisenhower’s comments to 
Congress on the fiscal year 1954 budget noted that about seventy-three percent of the 
budget was to be spent on six major national security programs.79  Only after a years long 
effort did his administration succeed in lowering annual defense spending.  By the last 
year of his second term of office, he had prevailed upon Congress to cut defense spending 
by nearly twenty percent.  When he left office in 1961, just under fifty-one percent of the 
budget was going towards national security.80    
 Eisenhower mostly benefited from the political support of Congress during his 
first two years in office, mostly because his party controlled both the House and Senate of 
the 83rd Congress, if only by a slim margin.  After two years in office, the support of his 
party decreased as the 84th and 85th Congresses both saw Democratic majorities in both 
houses.  It was the 84th Congress, backed by cotton industry lobbyists, that directly 
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contributed to the Suez Canal Incident.81  During his last two years as president, the 
Democrats overwhelmingly controlled the 86th Congress.  But while opposition gains 
generally meant less support in Congress, the decrease was less than catastrophic.  In 
1953, Eisenhower policies enjoyed a nearly ninety percent success-rate in Congress; by 
1960 his administration was still winning on sixty-five percent of the votes.82     
 But despite a Republican majority his first two years in office, Eisenhower did 
have to contend with a serious challenge from Senator John W. Bricker (R-OH), who 
attempted a Constitutional amendment.  Bricker intended to limit the presidential role in 
foreign affairs by giving Congress the power "to regulate all executive agreements with 
any foreign power or international organization."  Eisenhower’s administration spent over 
a year fighting this amendment, eventually managing to overcome its passage by only 
one vote in the Senate.83  Congressional pressure continued, though.  For the remainder 
of his presidency, Congress worked against Eisenhower’s efforts to reduce the defense 
budget.  In late 1957, the Gaither Report reached the American public.  It stated that the 
Soviets would be able to launch a devastating nuclear attack against America in a few 
years, and recommended a huge military effort patterned on NSC-68 that called for 
massive defense spending.84   Reports of the gap between Soviet and American 
intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities credited the Soviets with an advantage, 
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causing Congress to agitate for more defense spending.  As newspapers across America 
warned of Soviet dominance, Democratic Senators John S. Clark and Joseph C. 
O’Mahoney assailed the president for keeping the truth from the American public.  
O’Mahoney further stated that the report might be proof that Eisenhower was not capable 
of performing his duties.85   
 Adding to Gaither’s report was a New York Herald article by Joseph Alsop 
charging Eisenhower with misleading the nation while the Soviets increased the missile 
gap and gained an unmatched nuclear strike capability.  Alsop, a prominent columist who 
took credit for coining the term "Domino theory," had a large readership, but also his 
own troubles.  While he was in Moscow to interview Premier Khrushchev, Alsop had 
fallen prey to a Russian “Honey Trap” set by KGB agents who had photographed him in 
the midst of a sexual encounter with a young man.  The Soviets failed to turn Alsop into a 
spy, but this encounter compromised his lifestyle, and his homosexuality became the 
subject of considerable domestic and international intrigue.86  Despite the resulting 
credibility problem, the Democratic majority in Congress used Alsop’s “Missile Gap” 
article to allocate a billion dollars more than the president wanted to spend on missiles 
and long-range bombers.87  The president’s message in the Fiscal Year 1959 budget 
reflects his displeasure at the extra spending, and he concluded it with a call for 
cooperation. 
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Our response must rise above personal selfishness, above sectional interests, 
above political partisanship.  The goal of lasting peace with justice, difficult 
though it may be to achieve, is worth all of our efforts.  We must make the 
necessary sacrifices to attain it.  Our own people demand it and the nations of the 
world look to us for leadership.88  
 
When signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1959, Eisenhower was 
more pointed, stating that, "…in addition to appropriating over $1 billion more than I 
consider necessary for our security, [Congress] has placed mandatory minimum strengths 
on the reserve components of the Army. This is an action which seriously disturbs me 
and which represents an unprecedented departure from past policy.”89    
 Congressional elections influenced Eisenhower’s foreign policy as well, for with 
each subsequent election the Democrats gained majorities in both the House and Senate.  
This opposition party majority made it harder and harder for Eisenhower to gain support 
for his foreign policy, even though his presidency remained secure.  Meanwhile, Vice 
President Nixon successfully carried the burden of campaigning for the president, as 
Eisenhower was sick for prolonged periods during the 1956 reelection.90  In the months 
leading up to the general election, the Suez Canal incident saw a seriously ill Eisenhower 
fighting through his ailments while managing this crisis.  And when his son John 
counseled the president not to offend Jewish voters by taking actions against Israel, the 
president responded that he did not care about the election.  He also wanted to ensure that 
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world leaders clearly understood that the American election was not a factor in his 
response to the Suez crisis.91      
 Lyndon Baines Johnson’s presidential aspirations also pressured the Eisenhower 
administration to catch up to the Soviets in the space race.  Seeking the Democratic 
nomination for the 1960 presidential election, Johnson used the national concern caused 
by the Soviet satellite Sputnik to publicly agitate for the creation of an federal agency for 
the development of space capabilities.  Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration Act partly because of Johnson’s bid for the presidency.92  
Establishing NASA created its own set of problems for Eisenhower.  The military wanted 
control, and he spent much effort containing the military’s angst when the new space 
agency became a civilian operation.  Some of the friction generated by the new space 
agency surfaced in a meeting of the National Security Council, where the military 
repeatedly pressed Eisenhower to change the language in a directive in order to give the 
military more control over the development of space weaponry.93   
 The crew of the downed RB-47H also played into the 1960 presidential election 
because the Soviets prevented Eisenhower from obtaining their freedom while he was 
still in office.  Premier Khrushchev discussed the significance of these captured aviators 
with Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson prior to the elections, implying that it would be 
problematic for the presidential candidates if the Soviets were to hold a public trial before 
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the election.  The Soviet leader also said it would be against the policies of his 
government to free the airmen before the American presidential election.  Ambassador 
Thompson believed that Khrushchev intended to “gift” the pilots to whomever became 
the next president either to improve world perception of the Soviets or gain bargaining 
leverage with the new administration.94     
 Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy blasted Eisenhower’s foreign policy 
during the election campaign, capitalizing on the perception that Eisenhower had allowed 
America to fall behind the Soviets in the arms and space race.  Kennedy also criticized 
the president for failing to prevent the rise of Fidel Castro in nearby Cuba.  While 
campaigning in Tampa, Kennedy also accused Vice President Nixon of failure in his role 
as Eisenhower’s personal emissary to Latin America.  Kennedy went on to outline his 
plan to improve Latin American relations, including relations with Cuba.95  Kennedy’s 
campaign also faulted Eisenhower for the loss of the U-2 spy plane, the failed Soviet 
Peace Summit, unfavorable developments in a newly independent Congo, and many 
other foreign policy problems during Eisenhower’s watch.  While the world viewed this 
public debate, the constraints of term limits applied pressure and Eisenhower’s window 
of effectiveness for foreign policy closed.96  
 The public mood played a major factor in President Eisenhower’s foreign policy, 
too.  Throughout his presidency, he battled the public’s clamor for change – a clamor that 
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alternately inhibited and shaped his plans.  A persistent charge against his policies, 
carried out in the court of public opinion, was that the "Missile Gap" was real.  
Eisenhower knew that the Soviets were not ahead in nuclear delivery capability because 
of the CIA’s U-2 spy plane flights over Soviet territories.97  He truly feared nuclear war; 
during  a 1956 White House conference on nuclear fissionable materials planning, 
Eisenhower was emphatic in his belief that the public was concerned over the effects of 
nuclear radiation and the other consequences of a nuclear war.  The president wanted to 
limit the production of military nuclear materials and slow or cancel atomic weapons 
testing.98   
 Despite his concerns and his desire to slow the growth of the military, 
Eisenhower’s administration presided over a dramatic increase in American nuclear 
weapons capability.  The missile gap became a political tool used against Eisenhower, 
and it originated from worst-case scenario intelligence estimates that assumed the Soviets 
would do everything they were technologically capable of doing.  Error, resource 
constraints, and Soviet consideration of U.S. countermeasures were not factored in.99  
Available intelligence had already verified that the worst-case assumption was 
unrealistic, but this perception resulted in more strategic weapons development and 
growth.  From 1958 to 1961, the U.S. nuclear arsenal increased from six thousand to 
eighteen thousand nuclear weapons.  Worse yet, the build-up only heightened public 
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anxiety.  As both sides developed more atomic weapons, fears of nuclear war became a 
fact of public life.  Organizations supported by celebrities rallied for control of nuclear 
power.  News of Japanese fishermen poisoned by radioactive fallout, and Nevil Shute’s 
book On the Beach, which was later made into a movie, caused many to fear that 
Eisenhower’s reliance on nuclear retaliation would bring about the end of the world.100  
Secretary of State Dulles’ interview in Life Magazine also resulted in a re-branding of 
Eisenhower’s New Look policy.  Dulles’ comments about the president bluffing with 
nukes to prevent war with China caused backlash both at home and abroad.  As the 
wisdom of Massive Retaliation was questioned, critics argued for an increase in 
conventional capability to offset its all or nothing approach.  To appease the critics, 
Eisenhower modified his policy to accommodate more flexible responses.101  His 
successor would expand on this flexibility. 
 As Eisenhower’s public approval ratings began to slip in his second term, heart 
and intestinal problems also plagued him.  Some ailments caused lengthy hospitalization 
at crucial times, including a six-week recovery from a heart attack in late 1955 and a 
1956 bowel obstruction surgery.  Even when not hospitalized, bouts of illness would 
incapacitate the president for long stretches of time.  That he often worked himself to 
exhaustion only made temporarily debilitating illnesses more likely.  Eisenhower coped 
with these chronic conditions with alcohol and sleeping pills.102  Adding to the burden of 
poor health was the loss of Eisenhower’s key advisors and prominent positions in his 
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administration.  John Foster Dulles became ill, resigned, and later passed away.  National 
Security Advisor Robert Cutler also left.  The schism between CIA director Allen Dulles 
grew in the aftermath of the U-2 downing and the failed Indonesia coup and, by that time,  
the president was on his third secretary of defense.  The combination of poor health, 
changes in key administration members, and declining public opinion caused some to 
attack his presidency.  Harper’s Magazine called for Eisenhower to resign, referring to 
his administration as, “A leaky ship with a committee on the bridge and a crippled 
captain giving orders from sickbay.”103   
 This discussion of Eisenhower does not touch on every aspect of his 
administration’s foreign policy.  It does, however, address most major policy issues 
during both his terms in office.  Viewed from the perspective of GPACED, these major 
issues compelled Eisenhower to take certain actions and avoid others.  
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The president had to take these actions even when they interfered with his goals.                                                                                           
The geopolitical situation and Congress mattered most, compelling Eisenhower's 
administration to take actions not of his own choosing almost two-thirds of the time.  




















 The analysis of John F. Kennedy's administration begins with a look at his foreign 
policy role.  Unlike his predecessor, JFK had very limited experience in foreign policy, 
strategic level leadership, or as an executive.  An ambitious politician elected to the 
House of Representatives in 1946, Kennedy served there until elected to the Senate.  As a 
senator from 1953-1960, he became interested in foreign policy and acquired some 
experience, but only served on domestic committees.104  Once in the White House, his 
most trusted advisors were National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, his brother, 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and his speechwriter, Theodore Sorenson.  His 
expanded group of senior advisors included Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General Maxwell Taylor.105  
 Bundy had been a Harvard dean, an experienced foreign policy expert who had 
worked on the Marshall Plan with Henry Stimson and Dean Acheson.  He was a capable 
yet arrogant man who confidently managed Kennedy’s loose organization.  Rusk had 
served the Truman administration as an assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs 
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but despite that experience frequently deferred to Kennedy while serving as secretary of 
state, sometimes abdicating his own responsibilities.  In contrast to Bundy, Rusk was a 
quiet personality who only intended to serve at the pleasure of the president.  McNamara, 
former president of Ford Motor Company who had helped modernize the iconic 
automaker, brought a businessman’s perspective to the Department of Defense.  Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy occasionally stepped outside of that role, helping to solve 
problems in other areas when the president ran into roadblocks.  Taylor was a career 
army officer who came out of retirement to join Kennedy’s administration after the Bay 
of Pigs operation had failed.  Initially an advisor, he moved on to serve as the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1964.  Small groups of inexperienced but talented and 
highly intelligent special advisors rounded out JFK's foreign policy term.  Twenty-nine-
year-old Latin America specialist Richard N. Goodwin was typical of Kennedy’s young 
staffers.  Lacking a background in his assigned area at first, he quickly became an expert 
and thrived in Kennedy’s loosely organized and flexible system.106   
 The key people throughout JFK's administration all shared a common trait:  they 
were all chosen for their hardline anti-communist beliefs because Kennedy intended to 
launch a crusade against communism.107  Using these advisors, Kennedy organized his 
foreign policy-making apparatus to suit his leadership style and goals -- goals that 
Eisenhower's more bureaucratic NSC had not always achieved.  He also shared a popular 
perception that the Department of State was too cautious, too slow, and too large, 
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referring to it as a "bowl of jelly."  Kennedy preferred to run foreign policy in the White 
House "by seminar" using that small, intelligent-but-inexperienced staff of his.108  The 
president’s refusal to employ the more formal NSC processes from the previous 
administration is evident in his letter to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson delegating the 
president's NSC chairing duties to the vice president.109  After the Bay of Pigs incident, 
JFK moved National Security Advisor Bundy into the White House, where Bundy was to 
establish the NSC in the basement of the West Wing and set up a situation room that 
allowed for secure communications.  These new spaces in the White House gained Bundy 
greater access to international affairs; he and his staffers took over many of the State 
Department's foreign policy duties.  This arrangement and Secretary of State Rusk’s 
accommodating personality thus allowed Kennedy to function as his own secretary of 
state.110    
 President Kennedy's freewheeling planning and policy development structure left 
him at the center of decision making, but the system drew criticism as disorderly, chaotic, 
and prone to leaving key people uninformed and actions incomplete.  In addition to 
usurping the State Department’s lead role in foreign affairs, these changes caused a rift in 
civil-military relations as the services became shut out of high-level planning.111  For 
example, the Kennedy administration failed to remove outdated nuclear-armed Jupiter 
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missile systems from Turkey even though removal of the missiles had been discussed on 
several occasions prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis.  In an August 1962 meeting between 
Kennedy and his key foreign policy advisors, the president discussed contingency 
planning for Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in Cuba.  That meeting included a 
discussion of European-based American missile sites, specifically, that the Jupiter 
missiles in Turkey were useless, but they would be diplomatically problematic with the 
Turks.  Kennedy directed that they be removed, but they remained in Turkey, becoming a 
significant factor during the height of the Cuban missile crisis.112  Kennedy was furious 
to discover that his orders had not been carried out, but the disorganized planning 
environment was largely to blame, and would be again.113  Even so, America's youngest 
elected president's reliance on similarly youthful foreign policy advisors is not surprising. 
 Kennedy’s New Frontier campaign included a promise to block the threat of 
communism where the previous administration had failed.  Evoking campaign rhetoric 
that criticized Eisenhower’s Massive Retaliation policy, Kennedy’s "Flexible Response" 
aimed at present and emerging threats instead of reacting defensively after they had 
become a problem.  This policy permitted America to deal with all types of threats, 
containing global communism with military and/or economic pressure.  His policies 
called for a buildup of conventional capabilities, a closing of the perceived missile gap 
with the Soviets, the development of a range of counterinsurgency capabilities, expanded 
foreign aid programs, civil defense to help Americans deal with the results of a nuclear 
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war, and diplomacy that leveraged the United Nations.  The U.S. Army Special Forces, or 
"Green Berets," and the Peace Corps resulted from Kennedy’s goals and belonged to a 
foreign policy that was very much an extension of Truman’s Containment.114       
 The youth and inexperience of Kennedy's foreign policy team was a disadvantage 
made worse by his purging of more experienced key personnel, especially at the State 
Department, where his young staff alienated many of the old hands with its pompous 
attitude.115  His reorganization of the national security planning apparatus built under 
Eisenhower also isolated his policymaking team from the subject matter expertise and 
judgment of veteran policymakers.  The resulting loss of useful insight left Kennedy’s 
foreign policy apparatus unprepared for challenges that the geopolitical environment 
would present. 
 Two weeks before Kennedy took office, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had 
given a speech at Moscow's Institute of Marxism-Leninism that redefined peaceful 
coexistence by promising to support wars of national liberation.  According to California 
newspaper columnist Stanley Johnson, who covered the speech, the Soviet premier 
warned that war would come if the capitalist nations resisted communism’s victories, and 
that the fertile fields for communist awakenings in Asia had doomed the forces of 
imperialism.  The world, he said, could not allow those doomed forces to drag millions 
into the grave.116  One such war of liberation was underway in Laos, where Kennedy had 
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his first opportunity to employ the Flexible Response strategy.  In 1958, Eisenhower’s 
administration had used the CIA and foreign aid to maintain a pro-Western government 
in Laos but, in 1960, Laotian nationalists had threatened this government.  One such 
group was the Pathet Lao, a former World War II communist resistance group.  With 
backing from the Soviets and North Vietnam, they and other nationalists had briefly 
gained control of the country before loyalist forces pushed them out.  The Pathet Lao 
were again threatening the loyalist government when Kennedy took office.  For anti-
communists like JFK, Laos was one of the “dominoes” of the region; if it fell to 
communism, the assumption was that all of Southeast Asia would fall as well.  Laos was 
a major concern that Eisenhower had shared with Kennedy during his transition brief.  
According to Eisenhower, “[i]f Laos [was] lost to the Free World, in the long run we will 
lose all of Southeast Asia.”117    
 Kennedy used the CIA, and economic assistance to build up the loyalists while 
U.S. military advisors trained and equipped a twenty-five-thousand-man army to defend 
the government.  However, these efforts did not prevent the civil war from widening.  
With backing from North Vietnam the Pathet Lao gained ground, seizing key 
infrastructure from the government including the last operational airfield.  While the 
loyalists were losing ground, Kennedy had to contend with the fallout from the failed 
CIA-orchestrated coup in Cuba.  The president called for a Laotian ceasefire, while at the 
same time ordering hundreds of American servicemen in Laos to demonstrate American 
resolve in the region by openly wearing their uniforms.  The communists were on the 
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verge of victory, and the Government of Laos was militarily incapable of preventing 
Soviet-equipped rebels from seizing power.  National Security Advisor Bundy knew it, 
and warned the president that the Laotian government force “has no stomach and no real 
capability…development of their confidence and capabilities is going to require a period 
of years, if it can be done at all.”118   Kennedy moved more American military advisors to 
the region and even considered intervening with American combat units to defend the 
Loyalist government, before opting instead to let diplomacy to play out.  The resulting 
arrangement was less than ideal:  it called for a permanent end to the fighting, but made 
Laos a neutral country ruled by a coalition of all the warring parties.  In that coalition the 
communists had the most representation while the Soviet-equipped Pathet Lao held the 
strongest military capability and more than two-thirds of the country.119   
 Kennedy’s flexible response fell short of its goals in Laos.  Although he did end 
the fighting, he did not preserve a pro-Western government or block any domino-like 
communist expansion.  The large communist presence not only remained but, despite the 
neutrality agreement, maintained its ties with the North Vietnamese and the Soviets.  
That this Southeast Asian foreign policy problem had been forced on JFK is clear by the 
tone of a letter to the president from advisor Chester Bowles, who was preparing a speech 
for Kennedy on the Laotian settlement.  In this letter, Bowles provided some policy 
guidance, pointing out that American foreign policy goals in Southeast Asia were no 
more sophisticated than Eisenhower's had been.  The government, according to Bowles, 
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had simply been reacting to military situations with no clear objective in mind and had 
therefore ceded the initiative to global communist forces.120     
 Elsewhere, in a bid to improve poor third-world conditions that allowed 
communism to grow, Kennedy's administration started the Peace Corps program.  
American teachers, medical professionals, agricultural experts, and engineers traveled to 
Latin America and Africa to aid in social and economic development.  Kennedy also 
pushed his Alliance for Progress program:  a scheme targeting Latin America with 
monetary grants to help improve economic conditions.  But neither the Peace Corps nor 
the Alliance for Progress made communist takeovers any less likely, despite the presence 
of nearly five thousand Americans.  The people they helped showed little interest in 
American ideals and, two billion dollars later, the Alliance for Progress also failed to 
achieve its goals.121  A Missouri newspaper editorial captured some of the problems that 
the Alliance for Progress struggled to overcome, and called on Congress to do something 
about the grotesque situation in which millions of dollars were being demanded for Latin 
American governments.  The author also questioned the wisdom of having a virulent anti-
capitalist, anti-American Argentinean economist on America’s payroll as part of the 
Alliance for Progress plan.122  Lack of funding, corruption, distrust of American 
interventionism, and cultural differences prevented the sought-after reforms from taking 
place. 
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 Meanwhile, Germany was once again becoming an international flashpoint.  The 
Soviets and East Germans were losing manpower and intellectual capacity to the West 
through a steady flow of refugees from the communist satellite German Democratic 
Republic.  Their escape route was through West Berlin and, during the June 1961 Vienna 
Summit, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave the Western powers six months to 
leave.  Talks in the following days produced no agreement, and Kennedy ultimately 
responded to the Berlin ultimatum by taking a similarly aggressive stance.  Not only 
would he order the deployment of more forces to Europe, but he addressed Congress 
personally, asking for a three billion dollar hike in the defense budget, an increase in the 
authorized size of the U.S. military, and a reserve call-up.123  Congressional approval of 
those requests -- and of JFK's resolve -- caused the Soviets to stem the flow of refugees 
into West Berlin another way.  In August 1961, construction began on the Berlin Wall, 
and the six-month ultimatum passed without further incident. 
 The greatest challenge Kennedy faced was the Cuban Missile Crisis.  In August 
1962, U-2 spy flights detected Soviet nuclear missile sites under construction in Cuba, 
and the president formed a special advisory group from the National Security Council to 
plan a response.  The Executive Committee of the NSC, known as Ex Comm, provided 
the core planning group, its most frequent members being Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Joint Chiefs 
Chairman  Taylor, National Security Advisor Bundy, Air Force Chief of Staff General 
Curtis LeMay, speechwriter Sorensen, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson.  UN 
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Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and former ambassadors to the Soviet Union Charles 
Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson occasionally joined the Ex Comm.  This group 
provided the president with response options, but notes from Ex Comm meetings 
describe how difficult it was to obtain intelligence now that Soviet air defenses had 
improved.  Meanwhile, the construction of the missile sites accelerated.124    
 The urgent need for aerial reconnaissance that would not spark combat with the 
Cubans found Ex Comm planners literally struggling over wet paint.  One scheme called 
for the flights to be conducted by the United Nations so that Cubans would not fire on 
neutral aircraft.  However, only the American aircraft were equipped for certain missions, 
meaning that UN insignia would have to be painted on one or more U.S. aircraft.  The 
plan was delayed because the paint would not have enough time to dry before the flight, 
and no one wanted peeling paint to reveal an American star and bar.125   
 Kennedy demanded removal of the missiles anyway, and ordered preparations for 
an invasion of Cuba, along with a naval blockade that president’s administration 
diplomatically referred to as a “Quarantine” because a blockade is an act of war.  The 
Soviets challenged the quarantine at first, and the two powers came close to war.  
Meanwhile, some Ex Comm members, led by General LeMay, advised an invasion of 
Cuba even if the Soviets removed the missiles.  A confrontation was averted with 
assistance from United Nations Secretary General U Thant, who helped reach an 
agreement that allowed the Soviets to remove the missiles in exchange for American 
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promises not to invade Cuba.  In a triumph of backchannel diplomacy, Kennedy’s 
administration also concluded a secret agreement to remove the obsolete nuclear-tipped 
Jupiter missiles from Turkey.  Flexible response worked in this crisis, although Kennedy 
drew criticism for bringing the world closer to nuclear war than Eisenhower era nuclear 
brinksmanship ever had.126  But the Soviets did remove their nuclear weapons from 
Cuba. 
 Kennedy’s flexible response was also successful in eliminating a perceived threat 
in British Guiana.  His administration judged that the popularly elected prime minister of 
British Guiana, Cheddi Jagan, was a leftist moving the country towards communism.  
British Guiana was scheduled for independence from Great Britain after Jagan’s August 
1961 election, and American analysts feared that he would turn the country into a 
communist satellite once free of British rule.  A memo from the Special Assistant to the 
President, Arthur Schlesinger, outlined the basic course the administration should take 
against Jagan:  (1) Use the two years before the country’s independence to bring Jagan 
into the Western sphere of influence while establishing covert operations to counter the 
communist threats in the country.  (2) Remove Jagan if he did not align with the West.127   
 The covert operations soon took precedence over trying to win Jagan’s loyalty.  
Using clandestine CIA-manufactured unrest, Kennedy’s administration pressured the 
British to declare Jagan’s leadership as failing, citing the CIA-orchestrated civil disorders 
as evidence -- social unrest that helped Jagan’s political opponents beat him in the next 
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election.128  The asymmetrical subterfuge and political pressure on an ally, which strained 
Anglo-American relations, successfully installed a Kennedy-approved government in 
British Guiana.  
 Vietnam was Kennedy’s last major foreign policy challenge.  His administration 
inherited Eisenhower's commitment to protect South Vietnam under SEATO's terms and, 
like Eisenhower, he supported South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem with economic 
and military aid and military advisors.  Unlike Eisenhower, JFK significantly increased 
the presence of American military personnel in South Vietnam, and the supply of modern 
combat equipment and ammunition to Diem’s Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN).  Also in keeping with the flexible response strategy, he employed U.S. Special 
Forces in counterinsurgency operations such as the Strategic Hamlet Program. 
 Much energy went into The Strategic Hamlet concept.  This creation of fortified 
government-controlled villages as a bulwark against National Liberation Front (NLF) 
insurgents was based on a successful strategy employed by the British during the 
Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).  Key to the success of these villages was the support 
of the South Vietnamese government (GVN) and effective establishment of the 
individual hamlets, but the Diem government rushed the process, leaving them 
inadequately prepared and incapable of repelling communist guerrilla attacks.  Diem was 
also unable to compel his provincial leaders to use all strategic hamlet resources for their 
 
128 Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy 
(New York.: Viking Press, 1972), 212-215. 
75 
 
intended purpose.  The result was an inconsistent, ineffectual program that demonstrated 
Diem's inability to protect his population from the Viet Cong.129   
 A report prepared for General Taylor described Ngo Dinh Diem’s government as 
administratively paralyzed, visibly deteriorating, and crippled by intrigue, nepotism, and 
corruption.  The report concluded that only a drastic change at the top of the government 
could create conditions for improvement and that Diem’s leadership was part of the 
problem.130  Kennedy’s administration thus encouraged a coup to replace Diem, which 
resulted in his murder.  The president did have reservations about becoming militarily 
engaged in Vietnam but, as an ardent believer in the domino theory, was determined to 
keep South Vietnam and the surrounding region out of communist hands.  That 
determination can best be measured by his commitment of American forces.  Eisenhower 
had one thousand advisors in Vietnam when Kennedy took office, but by the time of 
Kennedy’s assassination, there were seventeen thousand in the country.131  
 At the Vienna Summit on June 4, 1961, when Soviet Premier Khrushchev and 
Kennedy were discussing the Berlin Crisis, Khruschev also questioned U.S. 
commitments in Laos.  Kennedy responded that those obligations and commitments had 
been undertaken before he had assumed office, a statement that attests to the influence of 
prior administrations on foreign policy.132  Eisenhower had left Kennedy with what 
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Truman had left him and, although Kennedy advertised his Flexible Response policy as a 
departure from Eisenhower's New Look, it was also a form of Containment.  More to the 
point, it increased military expenditures by thirteen percent despite his efforts to distance 
America from reliance on nuclear weapons.  Although Kennedy inherited a smaller 
military than he wanted, he nevertheless used force to support foreign policy at a far 
greater rate than any Cold War president to date.133  
 The Eisenhower administration had also avoided treaties that included firm 
military commitments, but Kennedy nevertheless used SEATO to justify a greater 
involvement in the Republic of Vietnam’s fight against the North.  This advice came 
from Military Representative to the President General Maxwell Taylor.  Upon his return 
from a Southeast Asia assessment tour, Taylor reported that intervention under a liberal 
interpretation of SEATO's terms might be the best way to save South Vietnam.   
It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide 
how it will cope with Khrushchev’s “wars of liberation” which are really pare-
wars of guerrilla aggression. This is a new and dangerous Communist technique 
which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final 
answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may 
come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to 
attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Viet-Nam and impose on the 
Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is 
commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south.134 
 
 Eisenhower also left Kennedy with a CIA plan to remove Castro from power in 
Cuba.  Kennedy did authorize the invasion that resulted in the Bay of Pigs debacle, but 
the counsel of experts who had planned the coup and the sheer bureaucratic momentum 
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of a plan already set in motion was difficult to resist.  The new administration’s loose-
planning organization and JFK's disdain for the previous president’s formal planning 
process contributed to his giving the go-ahead even though National Security Advisor 
Bundy had cautioned him that the State Department, Department of Defense, and CIA 
were at odds about whether a force composed of Cuban dissidents could topple Castro’s 
regime.  The Defense Department and the CIA were enthusiastic about the chances for 
success, while the State Department held that no invasion should take place without 
careful diplomatic preparations.135  Assurances that a coup could not be linked to 
America or his administration even if it failed also factored in, but the official denials that 
followed the Bay of Pigs failure only made America look worse when the truth came to 
light.  Kennedy ultimately accepted responsibility. 
 General Taylor’s Bay of Pigs investigation shed light on how this secret mission 
had progressed from Eisenhower’s March 17, 1960 four point authorization for Castro’s 
removal to Kennedy’s April 4, 1961 approval of the invasion.  Eisenhower had 
authorized (a) the creation of a political opposition, (b) mass communications to the 
Cuban people, (c) covert intelligence and action originating inside Cuba, and (d) the 
building of an adequate paramilitary force with a cadre of leaders outside of Cuba.  By 
December 1960, this paramilitary concept had grown into a strike force even though 
Colonel Jack L. Hawkins of the CIA could not identify the official policy change 
authorizing it.  Taylor further determined that preparations to train and equip a far more 
conventional force -- much less paramilitary than originally conceived -- had been well 
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underway by February 1961.136  In the breakdown of routine briefings and staff functions 
that occurred during the transition period, it is easy to see how Kennedy authorized a plan 
that he thought was Eisenhower’s even though it had morphed into something much 
different.  The resulting failure not only failed to remove Castro, but encouraged him to 
charge the United States with Yankee imperialism and threaten to spread communism 
throughout Latin America.  In the end, Kennedy owned the outcome of what Eisenhower 
had set in motion.137  
 Kennedy’s party controlled both the House and Senate of the 87th and 88th 
Congresses, and his brief presidency enjoyed an overall success rate of eighty-six percent 
in Congressional votes supporting administration policies.138  Unfortunately, that support 
did not always result in foreign policy success; "softer" foreign policy programs like the 
Food for Peace initiative, Alliance for Progress, and the Peace Corps did not achieve 
meaningful results and many Americans viewed them as a waste of money.  Worst of all, 
the programs sometimes generated anti-American sentiment anyway.  Part of the problem 
was money -- Congress did not give Kennedy all of the funding he had requested.139  
Soon after the Peace Corps was established, it became obvious that funding was a 
problem.  In a letter to Secretary of State Rusk, Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver 
asked Rusk to speak to Senator Fulbright about the amount of money needed for Peace 
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Corps activities, saying it was a tragedy if the activities were smaller than those proposed 
by the president.140  Had Congress provided full support, the Peace Corps and other such 
initiatives might have produced better outcomes. 
 Congress also interfered with one of Kennedy’s efforts to establish closer ties 
between India and the West.  The previous administration had already enticed India with 
economic aid packages and JFK intended to increase the amount of aid in hopes of 
neutralizing Soviet influence.  That influence had become significant by the 1960s; the 
Soviets were now providing India’s military equipment, which complicated American 
relations with Pakistan and made Kennedy’s push for congressionally funded economic 
aid much more challenging.  In 1962, Congress cut the president’s proposed India aid 
package by twenty-five percent.141  Although Kennedy eventually got the full requested 
amount authorized, Congress’s attempt to cut the funding pushed India even closer to the 
Soviets.142   
 During the Berlin Crisis, the Soviets increased pressure on Kennedy’s 
administration by announcing their intention to conduct atmospheric nuclear weapons 
tests.  The president responded by allowing the United States Strategic forces to conduct 
their own nuclear tests, first underground, then above it.  Nuclear arms negotiations 
between the two countries eventually resulted in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 
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but the negotiations were complicated by a senate so divided that ratification was 
uncertain.  Ironically, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Act of 1961 further 
impeded Kennedy's ability to negotiate disarmament treaties even though he had 
advocated for it during the campaign.  This law mandated Congressional approval of 
executive agreements by reaffirming the requirement of a two-thirds majority vote in the 
Senate in order to discourage reliance on executive treaty agreements before they were 
finalized.  The nature of the secretive, compartmentalized negotiations exacerbated 
divisions in Congress, making it difficult for the president’s representatives to present 
approved options while negotiating with the Soviets.143  A memorandum to prepare 
Kennedy for a meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to discuss nuclear 
test ban verification shows how his administration had to negotiate the treaty with 
Congress as well as the Soviets.  The memo describes the resistance of the Senate 
Republicans, who approached the discussions from a partisan perspective.144    
 Kennedy's 1960 presidential race against Nixon had been hotly contested, and he 
clearly factored elections into many of his executive decisions that followed.  Timing was 
also a problem -- he was campaigning in support of congressional elections when the 
Cuban Missile Crisis came to a head.  Distracted by campaigning, he only became aware 
of the presence of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in October 1962, 
even though information on missile site construction had been leaked to the press in 
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August over Kennedy's public denials.145  The leaked information caused concern among 
some in the general public, especially as the missiles were nuclear-capable and the 
August newspaper editorial criticizing the administration for downplaying the missile 
sites was correspondingly blunt.146  Central Intelligence Agency Director John McCone 
held a discussion about these Soviet missile sites in Secretary of State Rusk’s office on 
August 21, 1962.  The intelligence reports noted the buildup of Soviet equipment on 
Cuba and, although they could not verify the exact nature of construction, they noted that 
the placement of nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba was possible – “a critical and dynamic 
situation.”  The group discussed possible courses of action, including naval blockades, 
should they discover nuclear arms in Cuba.  Kennedy was not present during this 
meeting.147   
 Reelection concerns also factored into Kennedy’s Vietnam policy during 1963, 
when Congressional support for it and his other foreign policies began to waver.  When 
the media attacked him for supporting Ngo Dinh Diem during the June 1963 Buddhist 
uprising, the president confided to a friend that only winning the war would confound the 
press.  In the short run, however, the televised image of a priest setting himself on fire did 
more damage.  When discussing the upcoming presidential election, Kennedy remarked 
that he would not be able to get the American people to reelect him if he gave up 
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Vietnam to the communists.148  And anti-communist campaign rhetoric was already a 
proven winner by that point.  Kennedy had chastised Eisenhower for allowing a 
communist satellite at America's doorstep and vowed to remove Castro during his 
campaign against Nixon -- a hard line stance had helped him win even though the Bay of 
Pigs operation later turned out to be a fiasco. 
 Kennedy's campaign rhetoric also hastened his decision to accelerate American 
strategic nuclear weapons capability.  By increasing the number of U.S. intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) sevenfold and gaining a three-to-one advantage over the 
Soviets, he kept his 1960 promise to close the "Missile Gap" even though he had proof 
that the only such gap favored the Americans.  Nor were the Soviets engaged in an 
expansion of their strategic missile program, yet this missile gap controversy was playing 
out in the national media by 1963.  Two years before, Defense Secretary McNamara had 
said that there was no missile gap, but Kennedy nevertheless directed National Security 
Advisor Bundy to say, for political purposes, that there was one.  Bundy's recommended 
response split the difference, acknowledging that there was not a gap favoring the 
Soviets, but left the definition of "gap" vague.  Kennedy disapproved of Bundy's draft 
and ordered a new one that helped "demonstrate that there was a military and intelligence 
lag in the previous administration that started the missile gap."149  
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 The nuclear arms competition was a domestic issue as well.   As America rushed 
to keep up with the Soviets, worries of nuclear Armageddon, and fears of an out of 
control military entered popular culture.  Some popular movies fueled a sense that the 
military was determined to use their nuclear arsenal.  Seven Days in May and Dr. 
Strangelove depicted reckless militaries taking over governments and starting atomic 
wars.  These worries undermined civil-military relations as Kennedy's new administration 
challenged senior military leadership.150 
 The civil rights movement also affected foreign policy by adding anxiety to the 
domestic atmosphere.  Challenging the evils of communism was a struggle for U.S. 
diplomats who could not reasonably justify legalized racism in the United States.  Cuba’s 
Castro often used race issues in America as propaganda against Kennedy and African 
diplomats on official missions in the United States were refused service in racially 
segregated areas.  One incident that made the news was a Raleigh, North Carolina, hotel 
restaurant's refusal to serve Liberian Ambassador to the United Nations, Angie Brooks.  
The hotel manager's complaint -- that it was a political setup because Brooks had a 
reporter and cameraman with her -- did not make the United States look any better, and 
Liberia lodged a formal complaint.151  Kennedy merely suggested that visiting Africans 
should try to avoid segregated areas, but he could not continue to ignore America's racial 
tensions.  As Martin Luther King and Medgar Evers rallied for equal rights in the face of 
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southern politicians who continued to resist the civil rights movement, they pressured 
Kennedy to support civil rights legislation.152     
 The friction of impending nuclear Armageddon, and the civil rights movement in 
American society certainly made extremist acts more likely.  Months before Kennedy’s 
assassination, an extremist assassinated Medgar Evers, and others blew up a church in 
Birmingham, Alabama, killing four young girls.  These murders were part of the 
domestic environment and in the most extreme and literal sense, Kennedy’s murder 
prevented him from carrying out his policies.  That presidential assassinations are nothing 
new makes them a very real aspect of this facet of GPACED. 
 The most significant foreign policy-related occurrences of the Kennedy 
administration reveal the influences of GPACED.   
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Although the geopolitical situation appears most often as a cause for preventing or 
driving foreign policies, the prior administration's impact on Kennedy’s presidency was 
dominant.  Those policies set in motion during the Eisenhower administration resulted in 
the most significant challenges.  Compelled, delayed, or prevented from accomplishing 
his own objectives almost twice as often as he accomplished them, Kennedy passed those 




















 Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency began shortly after 12:30 PM, Central Standard 
Time, on November 22, 1963.  His was one of the few administrations to start 
unexpectedly, and he had no specific foreign policy goals -- goals that most presidents 
form and express during election campaigns.  Instead of articulating policies, LBJ 
concentrated on uniting the country in the wake of Kennedy’s murder.  America’s faith in 
politics without violence was shaken and even though a pervasive mood of doom and 
gloom gripped the nation, LBJ succeeded in winning the trust of the public.  America’s 
political system, he insisted, would survive this crisis.153   
 Johnson had been a politician most of his adult life.  His New Deal platform had 
gotten him elected to Congress in 1937, if only by a slim margin.  After a failed bid for a 
Senate seat, he joined the naval reserves for a brief tour as a lieutenant commander in 
World War Two.  A competent naval officer and advocate of shipbuilding during his time 
with the Navy, Johnson remained a politician at heart -- the combat award he "earned" 
while a passenger on a bomber in the Pacific indicates that his tour of duty was little 
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more than a political stunt.  He returned to the House of Representatives and in 1948 won 
a Senate seat.  By 1955, he had become the youngest senate majority leader in history, 
and one of the country’s most formidable political figures.  His reputations for crudeness 
and cloak room arm twisting were much deserved.154   
 The politically ambitious Johnson had competed unsuccessfully against Kennedy 
in 1960 for the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate nomination, and when he 
assumed his duties as vice president, JFK denied him an office in the White House.  
Filling a general supervisory role at NASA and several other agencies, Johnson chaired 
National Security Council meetings even though McGeorge Bundy, who did have an 
office in the White House, managed most of the foreign policy.  Johnson thus became the 
nation’s ambassador of goodwill, traveling to thirty-three countries on “show the flag” 
missions and, when at home, drew assignments like entertaining the West German 
Chancellor during the Bay of Pigs crisis.  Despite this deliberate sidelining, Johnson 
gained relevant foreign policy experience during an assessment tour of Southeast Asia, its 
most crucial stop being in the Republic of Vietnam.155  Nevertheless, his forte was 
domestic politics and unlike Kennedy, who was a strong leader, Johnson preferred to 
make decisions by building consensus.  These consensus decisions often led to belated 
courses of action involving a great deal of compromise and incremental decision making, 
the results of which often fell short of stated goals.   
 Johnson began his presidency with Kennedy’s foreign policy team and maintained 
the in-house National Security Council structure installed by McGeorge Bundy, who 
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continued to control information flow into and out of the White House.  Much like 
Kennedy, LBJ relied on a small core group of advisors, in this case the "Awesome 
Foursome" that included Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy.  He held weekly working lunches 
to discuss policy with his team, and these lunches developed into the administration’s 
chief foreign policy planning sessions.  Unlike Kennedy, he relied heavily on Secretary 
of State Rusk for guidance, a relationship that eventually pushed Bundy out of the group.  
Bundy knew what was at stake and complained in a memo to Johnson that Rusk, and not 
the president, was is in direct communication with the Soviet government.156  The memo 
did not have its desired effect, and Walt Rostow became the president’s National Security 
Advisor.  Previously head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, Rostow 
was experienced in America’s current foreign policy challenges and had often 
participated in Kennedy's small group foreign policy planning sessions.157   
 Johnson's preference for small-group strategy planning sessions perpetuated the 
problems of Kennedy’s foreign policy planning apparatus.  The compartmented nature of 
the meetings made it difficult for accurate information to flow to the agencies that carried 
out the policies.  The president and his team also micromanaged the military effort in 
Vietnam, going so far as to make some tactical level decisions.  One 1967 memo from 
National Security Advisor Rostow to Johnson even recommended targets for Operation 
Rolling Thunder. 
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara asked me to put to you their agreed 
recommendations about which targets submitted by the JCS in Rolling Thunder 
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53 should be accepted at the present time, and which should be deferred until after 
Tet and until after we see what, if anything, develops in the various flowered 
negotiating tracks. 
They would accept nine military support targets (marked in red in the table 
attached to the enclosed map: barracks, ammo and supply depots. This table also 
indicates with a (d) the JCS targets which they recommend for deferral.158 
 
During the siege of Khe San, LBJ followed the battle's progress on a scale model in his 
situation room, at one point telephoning the base commander for an update.  Feeling 
deeply responsible for the troops in harm’s way and equally responsible for the outcome 
of the war in Vietnam, he also sought to prevent the conflict from widening into a fight 
with China or the Soviets.  But  Johnson's interest in strategy and broader military 
organizational affairs stopped there; Secretary of Defense McNamara ran the military and 
the war effort with the president's blessing.  McNamara was a superb manager, but had 
no experience in military leadership, and a dysfunctional relationship between the 
president's staff and senior military officers soon resulted.159  In one terse telephone 
conversation between Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Earle 
Gilmore Wheeler, Wheeler even instructed McNamara to let him overrule the service 
chiefs’ recommendations for a Vietnam bombing program.  Similarly, when McNamara 
overrode his generals' decisions about the use of air power, Wheeler demanded 
justification.160    
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 Johnson's efforts to correct obvious communication problems in his 
administration resulted in his 1966 National Security Action Memorandum no. 341, 
which created the Senior Interdepartmental Group and Interdepartmental Regional 
Group.  Better coordination between his foreign policy planners and the agencies who 
carried out the plans -- chiefly the Departments of Defense, State, and the ClA -- was the 
objective.161  Unfortunately, these new groups only duplicated efforts, adding to the 
confusion and disunity, while friction between civilians and the military continued to 
widen the gap of miscommunication.  The tension in Johnson's administration echoed the 
prevailing public fear of an out-of-control military bent on starting a nuclear war.  The 
president believed it was important for the civilian leadership to keep military leaders in 
check, but his foreign policy planning apparatus only magnified his own penchants for 
micromanagement and indecision.162   
 Johnson’s foreign policy, like Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s, was a variation of the 
containment strategy handed down from Truman.  Using Kennedy’s foreign policies as a 
starting point, Johnson acknowledged that the United States must remain strong – global 
communism was still the main threat – but also called for America to be temperate and 
just.  Seeking to capitalize on Kennedy’s limited détente, he told a State Department 
audience that diplomats needed to show patience and understanding for other systems as 
well as our own.163  Also like his predecessor’s foreign policy infrastructure, Johnson’s 
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organization consolidated planning and decisions at the executive level while isolating 
the primary decision-makers from the resources of the rest of the government.  Most of 
his key foreign policy team members had provided counsel to Kennedy and, rather than 
improving on the process or correcting noted deficiencies, Johnson and his advisors 
carried forward the negative aspects of Kennedy’s foreign policy-making apparatus and 
made them worse.  But while Johnson wished to emphasize the diplomatic element of 
national power, America's military involvement in Vietnam consumed his efforts, and 
LBJ's ineptitude as a commander in chief only compounded the problem.  Historian 
George C. Herring's rating of him as the least effective war president in American history 
is a fair assessment.  However, GPACED exerted a significant impact on LBJ’s 
performance as commander-in-chief. 
 Not that all of Johnson's efforts failed; in 1964, his emphasis on diplomacy 
proved a success when Fidel Castro used Guantanamo Naval Base as leverage to protest 
the detention of Cuban fishing boats.  When Castro shut off the water to the American 
installation, Johnson’s administration ordered the Navy create its own water supply so 
that a more serious confrontation could be avoided.  The idea had originated in a 
telephone conversation with Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT), when Mansfield suggested 
that Guantanamo should establish its own water supply and pull out of the existing water 
agreement with Cuba for breach of contract.  Not only was this a diplomatically sound 
option, but it would save the fourteen-thousand-dollar monthly fee that the U.S. paid to 
Castro’s government.164  Later that year, when Panamanians rioted in the U.S.-controlled  
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Panama Canal Zone, LBJ took a similarly non-violent route and got a successful 
outcome.  Dozens of people, including four American soldiers, had died and Panama 
suspended diplomatic relations with the United States pending a revision of all treaties 
with America.  Rather than intervene militarily, Johnson responded by withholding 
economic aid and threatening to build a new canal elsewhere.  Subsequent talks produced 
normalized relations and a draft agreement by 1967, and peace had been preserved.  But 
even diplomatic solutions came with costs; in order to avoid the use of force, the U.S. 
government made concessions that would affect subsequent administrations. 
 Nor was diplomacy always possible, as a crisis in the Dominican Republic 
proved.  When the Dominican Republic's president, Donald Reid Cabral, found himself 
losing a civil war, the assistance he requested from the United States was military.  
Within a week, over twenty-three thousand American troops were in his country 
preventing an overthrow by insurgents that Johnson, on the advice of United States 
Information Agency Director Carl T. Rowan, characterized as a communist threat.  
According to Rowan, it would be “well-nigh impossible” to justify the presence of so 
many American troops solely on the grounds that they were protecting Americans and 
other foreigners.  Once the communist takeover claim had proved just as dubious, Rowan 
then provided suggestions to mitigate the anticipated charges of gunboat diplomacy and 
consequent demonstrations or attacks against American embassies in Latin America.165  
The price of  keeping a regime friendly to American business ventures in power was a 
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further damaging of U.S.-Latin American relations.  What little goodwill gained by the 
under-performing Alliance for Peace program fell victim to gunboat diplomacy.166     
 More carefully considered U.S. military commitments were not always safe, 
either.  Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Treay Organization (NATO) in 
1949, France had been a charter member and key part of America’s containment policy.  
That came to an end in 1966 when President Charles de Gaulle orchestrated his country's 
withdrawal and demanded that NATO remove its troops and headquarters from French 
territory.  In 1964, the French government had granted diplomatic recognition to the 
People's Republic of China -- the same year that China had become a nuclear power -- 
and the departure from NATO was but another indication that de Gaulle intended to steer 
an independent course.  However, by denying NATO the use of French ports, he was also 
making it more difficult for Johnson to maintain American troops in Europe, and 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk soon found himself seeking French permission for 
American and other NATO militaries to be in France during emergencies.167  
 France’s withdrawal from NATO also complicated Johnson’s efforts to provide 
weaker European countries with military and economic assistance.  In a planning memo 
on the NATO French withdrawal, Rusk warned LBJ that Congress would not provide 
enough resources to maintain an integrated European deterrent if France pursued separate 
agreements with the remaining NATO members.168  In 1967, NATO lost more of its 
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military strength when Great Britain recalled its forces from the European mainland and 
West Germany failed to build up its forces to previously agreed upon strengths.  Both of 
these developments weakened NATO significantly, and with it, America's containment 
policy.169  A flagging European economy and heightened European nationalism led by 
France’s abandonment of NATO compounded the problem.  
 Meanwhile in the Middle East, Egyptian and Israeli attitudes toward one another 
had not changed since the Suez Crisis of 1956 and, in June 1967, Johnson's efforts to 
solve rising tensions there were frustrated by what became known as the Six Day War.  
After a series of Arab-Israeli skirmishes, Egypt’s Nasser closed of the Strait of Tiran, 
cutting off the Israeli port of Eilat's Red Sea access.  Israel responded by attacking Egypt, 
and efforts by LBJ’s administration and the United Nations failed to halt the fighting.  
The Israeli victory drew threats of military intervention from the Soviets; threats that 
Johnson countered by ordering the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet to the region.  The threat of 
superpowers entering the conflict brought most of the fighting to a halt, while a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution ostensibly settled territorial disputes.  In practice, 
however, the UN resolution only broadened the claims of the antagonists, further 
polarizing the Middle East.  All the while, America’s open support of Israel with modern 
weapons complicated its self-proclaimed role as an objective peace broker. 
 A CIA memo on the eve of the Six-Day War summed up the challenges America 
was facing in the Middle East; an entire generation of Arabs had been raised to believe 
that modern Israel would never have existed without American and British assistance.  
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Rising Arab nationalism sought the destruction of Israel, yet the Arabs knew that 
America would always come to Israel’s aid.  Many Arabs called for boycotts and terror 
activities against all Western diplomatic and economic presence in the Middle East.  The 
Israelis also resented American regional presence because they believed America was 
holding them back; that they knew how to defeat the Arabs if only America would step 
aside.  There were hardened attitudes towards America on both sides of the Middle East 
conflict.170  After the Six-Day War, much of that assessment played out.  Some countries 
turned towards the West while others, like Iraq, sought help from the Soviets.  Iran 
dangled the possibility of joining the Soviets if America did not increase aid.  Israeli 
promises not to develop nuclear weapons rang hollow.  As America’s standing in the 
Middle East suffered, its ability to contain the Soviets suffered as well.171 
 Elsewhere, the Johnson administration did manage to negotiate two treaties 
successfully, both of which dealt with nuclear weapons.  In 1967 America joined other 
nations, including the Soviet Union, in signing the Outer Space Treaty, a ban of nuclear 
weapons in space.  The next agreement was the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
in which the nuclear-capable signatories, including the Soviets, agreed not to provide 
nuclear weapons technologies to non-nuclear capable nations.  Those signatory nations 
who did not already possess nuclear weapons agreed not to seek the capability.  Not 
surprisingly, the countries this treaty targeted (China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and South 
Africa) did not sign.  Johnson had scheduled a third arms control summit, but the 1968 
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Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia derailed it.  Meanwhile, North Koreans seized the 
American spy ship USS Pueblo, causing a significant distraction. 
 The president had to personally brief leaders of Congress on numerous occasions 
about the circumstances of the ship's capture, its mission, why it was not protected, and 
what America was going to do to recover the captured crew members.  He consulted 
national command authorities from former administrations for advice, including 
Eisenhower, who suggested a full range of options including the use of atomic weapons 
against bridges spanning the Yalu River so that commerce with China would be cut.172  
North Korea kept the ship, its spy gear, and its classified documents -- an intelligence 
treasure for communist enemies -- and the crew came home only after nearly a year of 
negotiations.173  Johnson's own state department sometimes proved less reliable than the 
former Republican president.  Early in his presidency, the administration had been 
working with a military junta to overthrow Brazil's president, Joao Goulart, whom 
Kennedy had viewed as an unreliable leftist.  A CIA operation launched during the 
Kennedy administration to remove Goulart from power had seriously destabilized the 
country, allowing the coup to succeed, and the State Department officially recognized the 
military leaders of the coup without the Johnson's consent.174  Although angry that he was 
not informed, Johnson did not reverse the State Department’s actions but provided the 
Brazilian coup leaders with military assistance and a show of force.  On April 1, 1964, 
the coup succeeded. 
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 Having inherited a big military and a weakened diplomatic capability from the 
Kennedy administration, Johnson also inherited the previous administration’s secretary of 
defense.  With little knowledge of military doctrine, Robert McNamara relied instead on 
the business management approach that had worked so well for him at Ford.  That 
approach manifested itself in the adoption of the Planning Programming Budgeting 
System, a budget forecasting and control concept started under Kennedy.  This was a 
system for identifying military requirements and budgeting for what McNamara thought 
necessary rather than what the armed services requested.  Sometimes this quest for 
efficiency worked, even though fights over government waste often played out in the 
national press.  One Associated Press story accused the Navy of wasting hundreds of 
thousands of dollars on uniforms, and William Newman of the General Accounting 
Office confirmed that the Navy was spending 2.5 cents per “non-functioning buttonholes 
in double-breasted coats.”175   
 Unfortunately, McNamara’s purportedly efficient budgeting system produced 
unintended consequences as well as intended ones.  It increased inter-service rivalry and 
competition as the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments vied for more tightly 
controlled resources.  Military leaders openly resented McNamara’s micromanagement, 
and McNamara countered by replacing all of the joint chiefs of staff with more 
deferential officers, citing a need for civilian supremacy over the military. Having 
transformed the U.S. war command system to one of crisis management by yes men, 
McNamara now operated with a chain of command that ran from the president through 
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himself directly to the commanders in the field, bypassing the uniformed service chiefs, 
who should have been advising the president on how best to use his military capabilities. 
To maintain at least some influence, the JCS Chairman, General Wheeler, adopted a 
“Foot in the door” policy with President Johnson.  His tactic was to push for what he 
wanted but to accept what he could get.176   
 Despite his preference for diplomacy, Johnson's chief tool for containing the 
communist threat was the large military built by Kennedy; a military whose strategic 
command and control system was degraded by McNamara's leadership style.  It was this 
powerful yet dysfunctional tool that LBJ would use to address another inheritance from 
the previous administration and one that would consume his presidency:  Vietnam.  
Johnson did not want to fight a war there, but Eisenhower's SEATO commitment, 
Kennedy’s increase in military advisors, and an underlying belief in containment made 
any other course unlikely.  After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, further 
escalation became inevitable, although Johnson cited the Senate’s overwhelming 
intention to honor its SEATO obligations as reason enough for America’s involvement.177  
But deploying major combat units still bothered him.  Campaigning for reelection in 
1964, he told prospective voters that he was "not about to send American boys nine or ten 
thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for 
themselves.”178  This reflected the Kennedy administration's original intent, as outlined in 
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National Security Action Memorandum 273, written for Kennedy but authorized by 
Johnson in November 1963, shortly after JFK's funeral.  It had set defeat of the Viet 
Cong as the condition for the withdrawal of all U.S. advisors by 1965, and was optimistic 
that victory could be won.179  The problem Johnson faced was that the non-military 
solutions he preferred could not happen without security provided by the military.  The 
threat of Chinese and/or Soviet intervention also weighed heavily on him and, beginning 
in March 1965, he committed U.S. ground forces.  The commitment was open-ended, 
reaching a maximum of 549,500 in 1968, because McNamara never understood what it 
would take to win -- the condition for leaving.  Meanwhile, his dysfunctional command 
structure poured resources into South Vietnam in an uncoordinated and wasteful way.  
The U.S. armed services essentially fought individual wars within their respective areas 
of responsibility.  The Army sought to destroy large enemy formations, concentrating 
their efforts on major combat actions.  Marine units focused their efforts on 
counterinsurgency actions, and the Air Force focused on deep interdiction.  Because 
McNamara did not know what it would take to win, America's war strategy flowed up 
from the tactical unit level in Vietnam rather than down from Washington. 
 Secretary of State Rusk fought his own separate war, too:  a pacification program 
aimed at developing governance and infrastructure to support the South Vietnamese 
population.  His Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, controlled the 
program, a hodgepodge of agencies so complicated that the sheer number of programs 
exceeded Bunker's capacity for management.  Pacification included security; most of 
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these programs could not run without military protection against the enemy, but lack of 
coordination and inefficient command/control issues made it difficult for Bunker to get 
support from American conventional forces.  Resorting to ineffective paramilitary units 
instead, Rusk also coordinated with other non-military agencies to develop security 
programs. 180  One such program, the CIA-run PHOENIX, became infamous for its 
counterinsurgency methods; its Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) earned a 
reputation as nothing more than assassination teams out to destroy Viet Cong political 
infrastructure.181  
Because Rusk did not synchronize his diplomatic efforts with McNamara's 
military efforts, the resulting compartmentalization and secrecy often brought conflict 
between the two.  In one instance, bombings near a negotiation site in Hanoi derailed a 
diplomatic operation codenamed MARIGOLD, which had been a promising peace 
effort.182  Commenting on the dysfunctional nature of the war’s command and control, 
Chester Cooper, a senior NSC staffer, stated that the peace effort was “unnecessarily 
diffused, duplicative, and less efficient and effective than it should have been.”183   
 Johnson’s Vietnam ordeal and his presidency ended with the Tet Offensive.  He 
had tried to contain communism in Vietnam with negotiations, government programs, 
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and economic support, yet repeatedly resorted to force.  Meanwhile, the seventeen 
thousand American advisors in country when he succeeded Kennedy had grown to well 
over five hundred thousand combat troops, and twenty-five percent of U.S. foreign aid 
was being spent there.184  The realities of GPACED compelled LBJ to fight in Vietnam; 
when he took office, U.S. military advisors were already involved in combat, and 
abandoning containment was politically unrealistic.  However, the inheritance of 
unbalanced elements of national power, weakened diplomatic capabilities, and a flawed 
foreign policy planning and execution system, is equally obvious.  The lack of American 
public support and the actions of both the North and South Vietnamese also complicated 
American troop when the conditions envisioned in NASN-273 were not established.  
Having dictated American involvement in Vietnam, GPACED frustrated LBJ's efforts at 
containment once there. 
Equally to the point, both happened despite a two-house Democratic majorities.  
Eighty-two percent of Congressional votes supported his administration’s actions but the 
few exceptions proved significant.185  When France pulled out of NATO, Johnson 
struggled to maintain economic assistance to Western Europe and keep American troops 
in Europe against the wishes of a vocal Congressional minority.  Accommodating the 
Israeli lobby before, during and after the Six-Day War was not easy, either.186  Congress 
put the most pressure on Johnson towards the end of his administration, when grass roots 
opposition to the war in Vietnam was putting pressure on Congress, including fellow 
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Democrats.  By Johnson's final year in office, congressional support of presidential 
policies had dropped from 84% (1964) to 77% (1968) in the House and from 73% (1964) 
to 64% (1968) in the Senate.187   
Under such conditions, gaining support for administration foreign policy became 
a struggle.  When Congress cut his administration’s requested budget for the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1967 by a third, he expressed his frustration in a signing statement, 
warning that “the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 reduces the margin of hope to the 
danger point.”188  Weakened  support also hampered the approval of LBJ’s 1969 budget 
proposal, as his costly foreign policies, especially the war in Vietnam, clashed with 
domestic program requirements.  Only after withdrawing from the 1968 presidential race 
was he able to get the budget through Congress, and only then with a six billion dollar cut 
in domestic programs.189     
 The 1968 presidential election also played into North- and South Vietnamese 
government strategizing, both stopped serious negotiations.  Johnson warned Senator 
Tom McIntyre (D-NH) on December 28, 1967 that “Hanoi will not negotiate until they 
see the outcome of the election of November 1968 here.”190  The American election 
influenced the Vietnamese in a more direct way as well.  The Republican nominee, 
former vice president Richard Nixon, had interfered in negotiations with the South 
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Vietnamese government while Johnson was trying to broker a peace between North and 
South Vietnam.  Johnson determined that Nixon's intermediary, the committed anti-
communist Anna Chennault, had convinced South Vietnam to withdraw.  Shortly before 
Nixon took office the national media exposed his meddling when one of Nixon’s 
campaign advisors leaked the story. 191   The Nixon camp had received messages from the 
South Vietnamese government several days before the election, indicating a possible 
delay in participation until after the election.192   
 No matter who the Democrats nominated in 1968, the Johnson administration 
needed a success, or at least palpable progress, in Vietnam.  For he needed more money, 
and to obtain the money he needed to raise taxes and cut domestic programs; unpopular 
actions during an election year.  When the 1968 Tet Offensive reduced American public 
support for LBJ’s Vietnam policies to ten percent and he withdrew his candidacy, he 
nevertheless continued to defend his Vietnam policies as free of election concerns.  One 
such defense was a discussion with Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL), who 
purportedly accused the president of playing politics with peace negotiations before the 
election.193  In fact, Johnson had told his advisors to ignore the political calendar when 
negotiating with Hanoi but despite his direction every political decision about Vietnam 
was also about the election.194  
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 The domestic situation towards the end of Johnson’s presidency was especially 
challenging.  Anti-war sentiment was widespread and very public.  Not only was draft-
dodging common but, in a horrific act of protest to stop the Vietnam War, a young 
Quaker burned himself to death outside the Pentagon.  The Pentagon was the site of 
another anti-war scene when, in October of 1967, fifty thousand protestors marched there 
to demand an end to America’s military involvement in Vietnam.195  Civil rights issues 
exploded into violence as well, with rioting in cities across America, with the Detroit 
riots of 1967 being the country’s worst since the Detroit riots of 1943.196  The civil rights 
movement also affected foreign policy, with activists promoting racially motivated 
African policies and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy fighting to maintain 
control.197  Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were both assassinated in 1968, and 
a flagging economy caused Johnson to call for higher taxes.  The same sectors of the 
American public also saw the Tet Offensive as a U.S. defeat, even though it was a 
military victory.  Images of the fighting on television contrasted sharply with the progress 
reported by the White House.  As America’s support for the Vietnam War took a critical 
blow, so did LBJ’s efforts to stay the course.  His withdrawal from the presidential race 
had been the only way out. 
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 Johnson’s poor foreign planning organization deserves some credit for his 
administration’s foreign policy failures but, as discussed above, GPACED dictated much 
of its direction, with the prior administration exerting the most influence.  His main effort 
and the foreign policy actions for which he is most remembered, America’s war in 
Vietnam, was a war he did not choose but one that he was compelled to fight.  
 














NIXON AND FORD 
 
 
 Richard M. Nixon had a brief career in the United States Navy, serving in the 
Pacific during World War Two as a transportation officer.  In 1946, he employed red-
baiting tactics to defeat incumbent Jerry Voorhis in the race for Southern California’s 
12th Congressional District and won a Senate seat in 1950 using the same tactics against 
Democrat Helen Gahagan Douglas, who famously referred to him as "Tricky Dick."  His 
strong political base in California and anti-communist stance got him noticed, and two 
years later, at age 39, he became Eisenhower’s vice president.  During the next eight 
years, Nixon gained foreign policy experience by assuming various presidential duties 
whenever Eisenhower was ill.  These duties included a July 1959 meeting with Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev, where the two engaged in the “Kitchen Debate.”  The previous 
spring, Nixon displayed poise and calm during an attack on his motorcade while on a 
good will tour in Venezuela.  More important was his chairmanship of several National 
Security Council meetings while Eisenhower was recovering from illness.198   
 Gerald Ford's early background is similar in some respects.  He served in the 
Navy in World War II, seeing action in the Pacific while assigned to the light aircraft 
 




carrier USS Monterey.  After the war, he was elected to the House of Representatives in 
1948, becoming House Minority Leader in 1965.  In 1973, he came to Nixon's aid, 
agreeing to serve as vice president after Spiro T. Agnew’s resignation.199   
 Both Nixon and Ford were experienced politicians, although Nixon’s foreign 
policy duties had given him far more first-hand knowledge and practical experience.  
While in Moscow during 1959, he met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev to discuss the 
ongoing Berlin Crisis and, in addition, outlined the official U.S. position on the status of 
Vietnam.  Khrushchev used Eisenhower’s policies on Vietnam as an analogy for his own 
position on the Berlin Crisis.200  Ford lacked Nixon's foreign policy experience, and was 
selected for the vice presidency because of his reputation for cooperation and willingness 
to accommodate opposition. 
 Assisted by few key advisors in the development and execution of his foreign 
policy, Nixon relied mainly on one person, Henry Kissinger, who served as his National 
Security Advisor.  A World War II-era German refugee, Kissinger served in the U.S. 
Army during World War II as a military intelligence specialist.  After the war, he earned 
his Ph.D. in political science at Harvard and remained on faculty there while serving 
simultaneously as a consultant to the National Security Council's operations Coordinating 
Board and Council on Foreign Relations during Eisenhower's presidency.  Working with 
Nelson Rockefeller on national security policy, Kissinger later consulted with the 
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Kennedy and Johnson administrations on various Cold War foreign policy issues 
including nuclear weapons non-proliferation.201      
 Ford also had few key foreign policy advisors, starting with Nixon’s team but 
making changes after his first year in office.  He retained Kissinger initially as his 
national security advisor and later as secretary of state, appointing Brent Scowcroft to 
replace Kissinger as his National Security Advisor.  Donald Rumsfeld was named 
secretary of defense, and George H.W. Bush, CIA director.202  Retired Lieutenant 
General Scowcroft was a career Air Force officer who had gained foreign policy 
experience from the military perspective as a senior advisor in the State Department, 
Department of Defense, and White House.203  Rumsfeld was a former United States naval 
aviator, a four-term Congressman, and a previous member of Nixon’s administration, 
where he had directed the Office of Economic Opportunity and served as Nixon’s 
ambassador to NATO.  Having helped with Ford's transition as White House Chief of 
Staff, Rumsfeld succeeded James R. Schlesinger as secretary of defense.204  A former 
torpedo bomber pilot, Bush was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the 
Texas 7th Congressional district in 1966, and ran  unsuccessfully for the Republican 
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presidential nomination two years later.  After losing a Senate race in 1970, Nixon 
appointed him an ambassador, first to the United Nations and later, to China.205   
 Despite those personnel changes, Ford inherited Nixon's organization, one that 
limited foreign policymaking to a very secure inner circle, with Kissinger in charge of all 
NSC policy making.  In fact, Nixon chose William Rogers to serve as secretary of state 
because Rogers had very little experience with diplomacy.  Nixon and Kissinger often 
performed the primary high-level state department functions with secret back-channel 
negotiations.  For example, the president met with Soviet Ambassador to the United 
States Anatoly Dobrynin early on and told him to deal directly with Kissinger on all 
matters of consequence.206 
 Thus isolated from foreign policy planning and decisions, the Departments of 
Defense and State took on low priority projects, some of which were never seriously 
considered, while Kissinger and Nixon secretly sought détente and an end to the war in 
Vietnam on the president’s terms.207  While Kennedy had begun the trend toward an 
increasingly smaller foreign policymaking organization, Nixon continued it, making 
planning more compartmentalized as well.  Ford inherited the secrecy and 
compartmentalization but tried to include more of his cabinet in the planning and 
decision-making process.  A struggle with Kissinger resulted and, not wanting to trust 
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both the NSC and State to one person, Ford added Scowcroft, Rumsfeld, and Bush in 
what became known as the “Halloween Day Massacre.”208    
 Nixon publicly announced his foreign policy in the summer of 1969.  If it worked, 
the Nixon Doctrine would see America extend its political, economic, and diplomatic 
support to any country that was threatened by communism while avoiding heavy military 
involvement.  Threatened nations would be responsible for providing their own defensive 
manpower -- America would no longer play world policeman.  Nixon preferred 
diplomatic engagement with peer powers and emphasized detente with the Soviets and 
Chinese, but like the foreign policies of every administration since Truman's, this was a 
form of containment.  Refining Nixon's emphasis on diplomacy with the communists, 
Kissinger insisted on the "linkage" of incentives and disincentives to American foreign 
policy goals.  Not only might granting or withholding economic aid achieve the same 
result but this carrot and stick diplomacy also assumed that each diplomatic action was 
linked to all others.209  Meanwhile, Nixon expected supported nations to share the 
burdens and responsibilities of local self-defense so that there would be no more 
Vietnams.210  Believing as he did in détente, engagement with the Soviets, and improved 
relations with the People's Republic of China, Ford shared Nixon's view.  He, too, was 
committed to providing what support he could to the government of the Republic of 
Vietnam.211   
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 Amidst all of these similarities, Nixon's isolation of the critical planning and 
decision making within the White House was the crucial difference, and despite Ford's 
efforts to the contrary, after-effects lingered.  The danger posed by such a closed system 
was not always apparent but, despite Nixon's practical experience in foreign policy, much 
of Kissinger's was academic.  Because Ford's retreat to a more open process was never 
complete, both administrations experienced significant pressures from GPACED. 
 Nixon’s détente scored a win for his presidency and surprised the world when he 
announced an official state visit to the People's Republic of China in 1971.  This was not 
a total surprise; his earlier easing of restrictions and discontinuation of patrols in the 
Taiwan Strait upon taking office hinted at those intentions, as did a May 1969 telegram 
from the State Department to the American-UN mission.  Early efforts to set the 
diplomatic conditions for formal recognition also include Undersecretary of State Elliott 
L. Richardson's low-level discussions with other nations about PRC membership in the 
UN and Kissinger's secret arrangement of an official state visit during a Chinese tour by 
American table tennis players.212  The president had the State Department announce 
support for China’s membership in the United Nations, eventually allowing the expulsion 
of former U.S. ally Taiwan from the same body.  Nixon’s promotion of détente was in 
line with his stated foreign policy and Kissinger’s linkage theory.  At the expense of 
Taiwanese and Japanese relations, better ties with China improved the chances that the 
Chinese would lessen their support for North Vietnam, thus making it possible for Nixon 
to bring U.S. troops home.  The president discussed these reasons for dialog with the 
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Chinese during an Oval Office meeting of January 26, 1972, citing the potential for 
reducing further confrontation in Vietnam.213  Nixon’s Chinese success was a signature 
achievement that would help his reelection campaign.   
 Meanwhile, mutually assured destruction remained the primary argument against 
using nuclear weapons, and an incident involving the construction of a base in Cuba that 
could house nuclear-armed Soviet subs reminded Nixon that a nuclear war could erupt 
easily.  Once in office, he sought to reduce the competition over strategic nuclear 
capability, and Kissinger began negotiations with the Soviets for a nuclear arms reduction 
treaty.  Unfortunately, his backchannel diplomacy and the president’s chief arms control 
negotiators often worked at cross purposes, a problem highlighted in a July 20, 1970 
White House conversation between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Kissinger about 
arms control.  Kissinger told Dobrynin that lead American arms control negotiator Gerald 
Smith was not authorized to discuss certain technical aspects of arms control that would 
be included in the treaty, thus disrupting an important effort at disarmament.214  Despite 
the confusion caused by Nixon’s compartmentalized foreign policy team, his 
administration successfully negotiated agreements to limit the production of anti-ballistic 
missile systems and offensive nuclear weapons.  These Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, 
(SALT I) were another success for Nixon’s foreign policy.  And Nixon’s Moscow 
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Summit was the first time a sitting American president had visited Moscow since the 
Russians formed the Soviet Union.215  
 Except for Cuba, Nixon and Kissinger preferred to expend little effort on the 
Western Hemisphere, the latter once acknowledging to a Chilean diplomat that he knew 
nothing about Latin America and did not care.  But this did not prevent the U.S. backing 
of a coup against Chile’s Salvador Allende, an avowed Marxist and lawfully elected 
president of Chile.  A 1970 National Security Council memo to Kissinger recommended 
subsidizing election campaigns of anti-Allende politicians and supporting any 
incumbents who also opposed him even before the CIA had commenced covert 
operations.216  The brutal dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet followed, bringing unintended 
consequences for the CIA in its wake, including congressional restraints on its overseas 
operations.217   
 Later in 1973, at the height of the Watergate crisis, the Yom Kippur War broke 
out.  The Arabs nearly succeeded in defeating Israel with a well-coordinated effort that 
included both military and regional economic cooperation.  While the Israelis struggled 
to resupply weapons and equipment depleted in the early stages of the fighting, the 
Egyptians hoped that a Saudi oil embargo would prevent the Americans from resupplying 
Israel while the Soviets replenished the Arab forces.  This embargo threat caused such 
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great apprehension among the major oil corporations that their leadership wrote President 
Nixon of their concerns: 
The terms demanded by OPEC at Vienna are of such a magnitude that their 
impact could produce a serious disruption in the balance of payments position of 
the Western world. 
 
We are convinced of the seriousness of the intentions of the Saudis and Kuwaitis 
and that any actions of the U.S. Government at this time in terms of increased 
military aid to Israel will have a critical and adverse effect on our relations with 
the moderate Arab producing countries.  
 
Much more than our commercial interests in the area is now at hazard. The whole 
position of the United States in the Middle East is on the way to being seriously 
impaired, with Japanese, European, and perhaps Russian interests largely 
supplanting United States presence in the area, to the detriment of both our 
economy and our security.218 
 
With Nixon sidelined by the scandal, Kissinger took over foreign policy and managed the 
crisis for America.  Defying the oil embargo and resupplying the Israelis, he allowed 
them to gain the initiative and go on the offensive.  Kissinger was also instrumental in 
establishing an international observer group to monitor the warring parties and negotiate 
a ceasefire once the Israelis had won.  He succeeded in preserving Israel but raised the 
stakes considerably by bringing all American forces to high alert when the Soviets 
threatened to intervene, yielding long-range negative consequences:  First, the Israelis 
developed a distrust of the United States when it prevented them from completing the 
destruction of Arab forces.  Second, although the United States had prevented the Israelis 
from following through, the American public came to fear weaponized Arab oil policies.  
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Third, and a rift developed between the United States and its NATO allies because the 
United States did not consult them about its heightened military force readiness.219 
 Ford began his presidency with one of the same challenges Johnson had faced:  
reassuring the country that America’s system of governance would survive a current 
presidential crisis.  The president and Kissinger also wanted to maintain the positive 
gains from Nixon’s détente with the Soviets and improve on SALT I, and Ford’s meeting 
with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev soon resulted in a SALT II draft agreement that 
placed limits on the numbers of nuclear arms for the next ten years.  These new arms 
discussions were a limited success, as each side agreed to the framework of the treaty 
without ratifying it. 220  During the rest of Ford’s presidency, arguments against the draft 
framework of SALT II from both sides of the aisle became political tools to be used 
against him in the 1974 mid-term election.  In an October 7, 1974, National Security 
Council meeting, Ford chastised the State and Defense Departments for allowing leaks of 
SALT II negotiations to the press.  Not only did media publication of this information 
damage the administration, but it was harming the talks as well.  President Ford gave his 
staff forty-eight hours to stop the leaks.221    
 Ford continued his détente with Brezhnev during the Helsinki Conference of July 
and August 1975, where thirty-five nations met to promote stability and international 
cooperation.  At stake was the ratification of several agreements, and Ford’s closing 
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speech noted that the United States hoped to advance human rights and the free flow of 
ideas, information, and people.222  The Soviets, on the other hand, hoped to solidify their 
position in Eastern Europe and, although both superpowers signed the agreements, Ford's 
Soviet diplomacy did not achieve any advancements.  The rapport he gained from earlier 
meetings was lost, as his personal exchanges with Brezhnev were antagonistic.  
America’s participation in the agreements was viewed, both at home and abroad, as 
abandoning Eastern Europe by recognizing the Soviet conquests of World War II as 
within their legal boundaries.  Ford’s hopes to advance SALT negotiations did not pan 
out either.  The Helsinki Conference was a setback for détente.223 
 Johnson left Nixon with what Kennedy had left him.  Nixon spent a great deal of 
time during his administration working to achieve his goals in Vietnam.  He directed 
studies on Vietnam soon after entering office and pursued a policy of Vietnamization 
based on these studies.  Vietnamization, as expressed by Kissinger’s National Security 
Study Memorandum of April 1969 required that the Republic of Vietnam be made to 
shoulder the load of combat and that American forces conduct a phased withdrawal.224  
For the next several years, Nixon and Kissinger embarked on a series of negotiations with 
the governments of North and South Vietnam to implement Vietnamization.  While 
steadily withdrawing American forces, Nixon pressured the North with intensified 
American firepower, mainly from the air.  He also extended significant American 
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military operations to the border countries of Laos and Cambodia, countries that the 
North had previously used as staging areas and supply routes without fear of U.S. 
interdiction.  While American forces fought the North, Nixon pressured the South 
Vietnamese leadership to agree to peace terms.  His conditions were that any South 
Vietnamese government left in place must be able to stand on its own for at least five 
years.225   
 Nixon and Kissinger both believed that all communist movements shared a 
common goal and centralized direction.  With this belief, the president’s Chinese and 
Soviet diplomacy encouraged both to leverage the North Vietnamese leadership into 
agreeing to Nixon’s terms, but reaching American goals in Vietnam via Kissinger’s 
linkage proved costly.  Amid negations, the North frequently attempted to gain ground on 
the South with increased military operations, and each time the North attacked, Nixon 
responded with force.  Nixon’s détente with China and the Soviets gave him some 
freedom of action to authorize a massive bombing operation against the North during the 
1972 Easter Offensive.  By January 1973, Nixon and Kissinger had gotten both sides to 
sign the Paris Peace Agreement, the massive bombing of North Vietnam being a key 
factor.  Unfortunately, adherence to the treaty was unverifiable and unenforceable, and 
peace, temporary.  Both the North and the South assumed the war would continue 
anyway, and actively prepared for the resumption of the fight.226    
 Nixon achieved his short-term goals in Vietnam, but only delayed the communist 
takeover and therefore failed to contain the spread of communism.  Compelled to deal 
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with Vietnam on account of the previous administration’s policies, he effected more of a 
compromise than a success.  Significant pressures from GPACED, as noted in the next 
section, limited Nixon’s choices in Vietnam. 
 Ford dealt with the aftermath of America’s failed containment strategy in 
Southeast Asia when North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam in 1975.  Soon after the 
hectic evacuation of Saigon, the president acted against the Cambodians who seized an 
American merchant ship, the S.S. Mayaguez.  He ordered bombing attacks against 
mainland Cambodia and assaulted a Cambodian island, believing the ship’s crew was 
being held there.  These unplanned frantic responses caused President Ford much 
consternation.  Angrily chastising his staff, he repeatedly demanded to know why his 
orders to prevent boats from leaving the Cambodian island had not been carried out.227  In 
fact, poor intelligence and the hurried nature of the operation was the cause of the island 
raid’s dozens of pointless casualties.  The Cambodians were releasing the merchantmen 
around the time that U.S. Marines were attacking the island.  Although flawed, Ford’s 
decisive response did win him short-lived, but fleeting public approval.228     
 Meanwhile, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress during Nixon’s 
entire presidency.  His record of sixty-seven percent in presidential victories for 
Congressional votes on measures supported by his administration reflects the majority 
opposition.229  Much of the pressure Nixon faced from Congress was over Vietnam 
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policies.  Not only was the War Powers Resolution of 1973 a blow to his freedom of 
action, but Watergate had already crippled his presidency when that act went into effect.  
Prior to the War Powers Act, Congress had moved to restrict Nixon’s military activities 
in Southeast Asia multiple times.  From 1970 to 1973, Congress proposed or enacted 
twenty-four measures specifically aimed at restricting Nixon’s actions in Vietnam.  Nine 
of those measures placed significant restraints on the president’s policies in Vietnam, 
prohibiting him from conducting operations in some countries while placing limitations 
on his force strength in others.  The Cooper-Church Amendment of 1970 barred U.S. 
forces from Cambodia and the Mansfield Amendment of 1971 went so far as to mandate 
the complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.230  Nixon’s response to the 
latter was especially pointed, emphasizing that "section 601 of this act--the so-called 
Mansfield Amendment-does not represent the policies of this Administration.  It is 
because section 601 of this bill will not in fact alter this policy that I have signed it into 
law.  I would add, regretfully, that legislative actions such as this hinder rather than assist 
in the search for a negotiated settlement.”231  These restrictions had a direct impact on the 
effectiveness of Nixon’s exit strategy from Vietnam.  The Defense Appropriations Act of 
1974 -- the final one of Nixon’s presidency -- barred any U.S. combat activities in 
Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia by restricting the amount of military aid to South Vietnam.  
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Ford’s ability to provide support to South Vietnam, as promised under the Pairs Peace 
Agreement, fell short because of this budget.  
 Ford struggled against a Democratic-controlled Congress throughout his 
administration.  The Democrats maintained control of Congress during his presidency, 
winning only fifty seven percent of the votes he supported.232  Not only had Nixon done 
better, but Ford's lack of recourse resulted in fifty-six vetoes.  Congressional opposition 
was constant; the first significant clash came when a congress pressured by the Greek 
lobby seeking assistance in Cyprus terminated military aid to Turkey.  Ford managed to 
delay the military aid embargo for a year, but eventual capitulation was inevitable.  When 
the end came, he warned Congress that national security would suffer as a result of its 
interference: 
The restrictions imposed in this bill on our military assistance to Turkey create 
serious problems. Without substantial benefit to any other country, these 
restrictions threaten our relations with a country which is a close ally, which is the 
eastern anchor of an alliance vital to the security of the United States, and which 
plays a fundamental role in the strategic interests of the United States in the 
Eastern Mediterranean area. It is for these reasons--the national security interests 
of the United States--that we have been providing military assistance to Turkey.  
…Congressional leadership must bear the full responsibility for that failure.233   
 
Congress proceeded with the embargo, and when the sanctions went into effect, NATO 
ally Turkey shut down nearly every American military and intelligence collection base on 
its soil.  This dealt another blow to containment as Ford lost valuable pieces of America's 
defense against the Soviet Union.  Congress also cut funding for South Vietnam and 
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Cambodia in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, prompting a rebuke from Ford that 
equated inadequate funding with likely mission failure and objectives left unachieved.234  
As the Republic of Vietnam’s economy collapsed and American support dwindled, the 
North Vietnamese sensed an opportunity and quickly overran South Vietnam.  The only 
request Congress granted for South Vietnam was to support Ford’s evacuation of the 
country.235  
 In 1974, Congress also sank a trade initiative sought by Ford and Kissinger.  After 
agreeing to a draft treaty, the Soviets were angered when Congress stipulated that they 
must recognize human rights before they would allow Ford to join in the commercial 
trade treaty.  Ford signed the law with Congress’ stipulations but noted that the 
complexity of its wording would make it difficult to implement and objectionable to 
other countries.236  As Ford had feared, Congress’ efforts to pressure the Soviets 
backfired; not only did they reject the treaty but increased their restrictions on Jewish 
emigration as well – the very human rights abuses that Congress had hoped to prevent.237   
 Congress also prohibited Ford from continuing the policy of containment in 
Africa, where he had been providing military assistance to the newly independent 
Angolan government in its fight against Soviet-backed Leftists.  Supported by thousands 
of Cuban troops, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was 
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gaining ground on Angolan government forces, when Congress cut off funding for 
military assistance.   “It is time these people put up or shut up,” retorted Ford.  “Congress 
has lost its guts -- they have cut and run, and we need them on the record.  No one who 
voted no can tell me to get tough with the Soviet Union.  There is a lot of talk but no 
guts.”238   Ford was unsuccessful in gaining the funds to support Angola, and without 
support, the country quickly fell to MPLA forces.  Angola joined the Soviet’s sphere of 
influence shortly afterward.239   
 Desire for a second term in office motivated Nixon’s efforts towards détente, and 
his early achievements with China and the Soviets contributed much to his successful 
reelection run.  Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was certain that North Vietnamese foreign 
policy actions towards America had hinged on the Nixon campaign, and that the North 
Vietnamese expected Nixon to woo voters with a softer Vietnam policy.240  Indeed, 
Vietnam was a significant issue in Nixon’s reelection campaign.  In October 1972, he 
emphasized to Kissinger that he did not want to withdraw from South Vietnam if its 
government were to collapse before the American presidential election.241  Domestic 
measures, including the Selective Service Reform Bill, which calmed conscription 
anxieties, also helped secure his reelection, but in the end, Nixon’s cutthroat political 
methods damaged his foreign policy most of all. 
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 The Watergate scandal was ultimately the biggest obstacle in preventing Nixon 
from achieving his foreign policy goals.  A scandal of his own making driven in part by 
motivations to succeed in the upcoming reelection, it frustrated the president’s attempts at 
control.  Nixon not only resigned but handed his successor a crippled administration and 
Ford -- essentially a lame duck for his entire term -- was unable to achieve any significant 
foreign policy goals. 
 Nixon’s South East Asia foreign policy generated widespread anger among the 
public when he informed America about his 1970 Cambodian operations.  The 
president’s announcement caused hundreds of mass protests at universities nationwide, 
including the May 4, 1970 incident at Kent State University that had left four students 
dead and another nine wounded.  When over 100,000 demonstrators converged on the 
White House five days later, Nixon attempted to appease the public by limiting the scope 
of the Cambodian operations.  He promised that American troops would move no further 
than twenty miles into Cambodian territory and leave the country by June 30th.242 
 Responding to the unrest, Congress formed an ad hoc committee to hear student 
views of America’s policy towards South East Asia and sixty-three university students 
from dozens of colleges testified in Congress over a two-day period.  The initial student 
testimonies captured the divisive nature of the Vietnam war’s impact on American 
society.  Greg Rambo of Kent State voiced support for Nixon’s policies including combat 
operations in Cambodia, adding that Senate actions to limit funding of the Cambodian 
operations were an insult to the integrity of the president of the United States.  The 
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second witness was Steve Kramer, a student at Whittier College, California -- Nixon's 
alma mater.  Kramer described the shocked reactions of students when they learned about 
Nixon’s secret invasion of Cambodia and decried the military-industrial complex that had 
taken over America.  The only way to avoid a civil war in America, he said, was to 
remove the power from the corporate-military elite and give it to the people.  The 
Whittier College student went on to extol the virtues of communism and criticize 
American international aggression.243  Not all of the student views were as extreme, but 
the ad hoc committee hearings increased the public pressure on Nixon’s Vietnam policies 
and brought about additional Congressional scrutiny on the president’s war efforts. 
 The domestic situation in 1972 factored into strategic decision making.  National 
Security Council Staffer Winston Lord stated that the U.S. domestic scene was an 
argument against a resumption of bombing.  Although it would bring temporary support 
from conservatives, the left would be critical, and American opinion against the president 
would intensify if the aerial attacks did not result in timely war gains on the ground or in 
diplomatic breakthroughs.244  Domestic reactions to events elsewhere also mattered.  
When the president sent a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal to support Pakistan 
during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, his lack of neutrality and Kissinger’s backchannel 
negotiations with the Chinese resulted in a near confrontation with the Soviets, whose 
navy was already supporting India.  The New York Times also published secret internal 
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documentation of the decisions to support Pakistan; documentation laced with some of 
Nixon’s mean-spirited personal attacks on Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi.  With the 
leak of these “Pentagon Papers,” the White House became increasingly fearful of further 
disclosures even though the leaked classified reports also reflected poorly on Kennedy 
and Johnson as well as Nixon.  Columnist Gary Wills of The Record typified media 
criticism of the president when he accused Nixon of using the American public as a tool 
for pressuring his enemies.245  Within a week of the release of the Pentagon Papers, the 
president’s staff created a special unit nicknamed the “Plumbers” to stop the leaks.  
Nixon’s attempts to identify and stop the disclosure of these damning reports drew him 
closer to the scandal that allowed the GPACED system to remove him from office.246   
 The Watergate scandal killed Nixon's foreign policy, and amid the growing 
domestic and international perception of the president's abuse of power, his efforts for 
détente became ineffective.  Kissinger carried the load and tried to maintain détente while 
Nixon retreated from the public, but when Nixon stepped down and Ford took over, the 
new administration was unable to revive détente effectively.  Not only did the office of 
the president lose credibility because of Watergate but Ford's pardon of Nixon cost it 
even more.247  
 Nixon was initially effective in attaining the foreign policy goals the system 
compelled him to undertake, but his actions also resulted in Watergate and GPACED 
punished his administration accordingly.  The system prevented both he and Ford from 
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achieving their goals at a higher rate than the previous administrations.                
Congress exerted the most influence.  The system of GPACED dominated foreign policy 
for the duration of Ford’s presidency and did not release its grip until the next 
administration took power.  
 

















Jimmy Carter graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and 
became a nuclear submarine engineer officer, but resigned his commission after his 
father’s death to run the family business.  As Carter’s business flourished, he became 
active in local politics and in 1962 won a seat as a Georgia state senator.  He became 
Governor of Georgia on his second attempt, and from there secured the Democratic Party 
nomination, winning a narrow victory in the 1976 election.  As president, Carter was a 
religious man with strong convictions who genuinely cared for people and wanted a 
government that would work for the public good.  Acting on this central leadership 
theme, he tried to represent the public interest by choosing morally correct goals rather 
than politically expedient ones.  He also believed that he was serving the global 
community as well as America, and that an inherently "stupid and venal" government 
could not succeed.  Only intelligence and honesty would solve problems.  Unfortunately, 
his sense of political timing for major initiatives was flawed.248    
Domestic issues accounted for the bulk of President Carter’s experience; he came 
to the presidency with no practical knowledge in foreign policy.  What he brought to the 
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office was a strong work ethic and executive experience gained as Georgia’s governor.  
He also brought a keen, detail-oriented mind and a tendency to work out problems by 
himself; a habit he had developed in previous offices.  Working with this hands-on 
mindset, President Carter tried to learn everything about an issue so that he could fix it 
from a position of knowledge.  He spent thirty hours a week reading background 
information on matters brought to him for consideration, which often made him more 
knowledgeable about proposed legislation than congressional committee leaders.  But if 
Congressmen did not have the slightest idea what was in their bills, Carter’s own 
expertise stemmed from a work ethic that ultimately overtaxed him.249  This penchant for 
doing too many things at once with little prioritization prevented him from seeing 
individual problems in a broader geopolitical context. 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski were Carter’s principal foreign policy team members.  Experience as the 
deputy secretary of defense under President Johnson and participation in the Paris Peace 
Talks in 1968 and 1969 had convinced Vance that America was unable to solve every 
problem.  Instead of military intervention, he believed in peace through negotiations and 
economic ties.  Brzezinski, on the other hand, distrusted the Soviets and had no faith in 
détente – attitudes one might expect of a Polish immigrant with practical experience as a 
foreign policy advisor under Kennedy and Johnson.250  
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Reacting against Nixon’s centralized foreign policy apparatus, Carter established 
a decentralized one in which cabinet members took his direction and then implemented 
policy at the department level.  He also expected cabinet members to be friends and 
equals rather than competitors in argument mode during coordination meetings.  A more 
open administration whose policymaking included the entire cabinet, he reasoned, would 
avoid the sort of duplicity that had plagued previous administrations.  Accordingly, 
Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-2 reorganized his administration’s National 
Security Council structure by consolidating a few subgroups that existed under Nixon’s 
NSC and placing them in a Policy Review Committee.  Notably, Carter also took the 
chairmanship of this consolidated group from Brzezinski and gave Vance more control 
over national security council sessions.251    
Ironically, Carter’s inclusiveness revived a process that he had hoped to discard.  
Like Johnson, Carter held weekly breakfast meetings; only the key players --Vance, 
Brzezinski, Vice President Mondale, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown -- had 
changed.  Carter led the discussions, and foreign policy decisions were made at these 
working breakfasts.252  The decisions required staffing for effective implementation, but 
Carter’s hands-on, central coordinator method of leadership left room for 
miscommunication and omissions. 
Carter began his administration without a chief of staff.  He attempted to handle 
all communication himself but eventually realized he needed assistance to manage the 
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volume of work passing through his office.  Hamilton Jordan was the solution.  As chief 
of staff, he conducted a study of staff functions and noted that it was difficult to track, let 
alone control the information flow of foreign policy actions coming to the president’s 
office.  Jordan also noted that Brzezinski and a few others were bypassing the staff and 
bringing foreign policy memos directly to Carter.253  While Jordan brought some 
organizational control to the White House, the president’s deep simultaneous 
involvement in many issues at once created problems for his foreign policy 
implementation. 
President Carter wanted to correct the wrongs of the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations, and bring back honest government that met the needs of the common 
public.  Fittingly, he had campaigned for president using a fair, open, decent, and 
competent government platform, all themes countering the Vietnam and Watergate eras.  
The president and his secretary of state held Wilsonian views -- they sought to cooperate 
in the spirit of peace with America’s competitors while pushing for human rights causes, 
and helping developing nations.254  Carter presenting his purportedly more democratic 
and humane foreign policy at the University of Notre Dame's Spring 1977 
commencement, reaffirming America’s commitment to human rights and vowing to 
reinforce America's bonds with other democracies.  President Carter also called for 
engagement with the Soviets to halt nuclear and conventional arms proliferation and 
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bring about peace in the Middle East.255  Presidential Directive /NSC-18, US National 
Strategy, emphasized the non-military elements of power, especially diplomacy and 
economics.  The spirit of NSC-18 shifted competition with the Soviets to political 
engagement, with diplomacy being the main effort.256   
Secretary of State Vance worked early to set the conditions for Carter’s Middle 
East Peace initiatives and, although the president’s immediate goal of reviving the 
Geneva Conference was not attainable, he did convince the leaders of Israel and Egypt to 
meet at Camp David.  The meetings between Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Israel’s 
Menachim Begin produced no agreement, but Carter’s follow-up diplomacy produced an 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty several months later.  While the agreement fell short of 
Carter’s goals, it did produce calmer relations between Egypt and Israel.257  
Diplomacy with China early in his administration also brought limited success.  
At the expense of Taiwan’s peace of mind – China agreed not to seek unification by force 
– America normalized diplomatic relations with Communist China.  When the Soviets 
invaded Afghanistan in April 1979, Carter responded by authorizing the sale of 
equipment and sharing of intelligence with the Chinese, but pressuring the Kremlin in 
this way meant that Carter had to backtrack on his human rights principles.  Congress 
resisted, and passed a Taiwan Relations Act containing provisions for American arms 
sales to Taiwan should the People's Republic of China attack.  The act specified that 
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“…the United States shall make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense 
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 
self-defense capacity."258  These defense provisions caused strained relations with the 
newly recognized Communist Chinese.    
Another initial success for the Carter Administration was the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) with the Soviet Union, but it also encountered a human 
rights stumbling block.  Repeated American attempts to link human rights to the treaty 
complicated the negotiations, but the Soviets eventually relented.  An extension of 
Mutually Assured Destruction, SALT II aimed at maintaining strategic nuclear weapons 
parity between the two superpowers.  Once Carter and Brezhnev had signed the 
agreement in Vienna, it encountered strong opposition led by Senate Armed Services 
Committee member Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona).  He would vote against ratification, he 
told Carter, because verification of Soviet compliance would be impossible.259  
Congressional resistance and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prevented SALT II’s 
ratification. 
The SALT II agreement was but one of several major foreign policy initiatives 
during 1977-1979, when efforts to secure a Middle East peace agreement and ratification 
of the Panama Canal Treaty were also in progress.  Such ambitious foreign policy goals 
compounded the effects of changes in the geopolitical environment.  Carter’s personal 
overextension did not go unnoticed either, with White House Chief of Staff Jordan 
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critiquing his multitasking, arbitrary deadlines, and out-of-context decision making.  
Carter acknowledged his problem in a hand-written reply and characterized his situation 
as frantic.260  This frantic situation caused him to overlook a developing problem in Iran. 
The problem was Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s increasingly despotic rule and 
the disagreement among key foreign policy advisors over how to deal with it.  This 
division and Carter’s inattention contributed to the loss of American influence in the 
region.  The April 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan compounded the problem, 
making Carter’s goals of engagement and reduction of military competition with the 
Soviets unattainable.  Once again, the Cold War heated up, this time with anti-Soviet 
embargoes and a notoriously unpopular U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics.  This debut 
of the Carter Doctrine, a declaration that threats in the Persian Gulf constituted an assault 
on U.S. vital interests, in turn caused Carter to stop Congress’s military budget slashing 
and develop Enhanced Radiation Weapons.261  In his 1980 Presidential Directive 59, 
“Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy” (PD-59), Carter announced to the Soviets that 
any nuclear attack on America would be met with enough force to render any gains 
meaningless.  Not only did PD-59 explicitly extend American nuclear targeting to Soviet 
industrial, political, and urban centers, but civilian population centers as well; a strategy 
nearly identical to that ordered by Eisenhower in 1958.262  Like Carter, he had concluded 
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that only a retaliatory strike against both military and urban-industrial targets would 
destroy Soviet nuclear offensive capability.263  As with previous administrations, the 
geopolitical situation forced Carter to engage the Soviets in Cold War rhetoric and 
emphasize military power over diplomacy. 
World events also led to a reversal of human rights policy in Central America.  
National Security Advisor Brzezinski’s January 1979 memo to Carter expressed the 
administration’s stance on Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, whose widely reported 
human rights violations had caused the withdrawal of American support.  The 
Nicaraguan leader did not align with communist ideologies, which was important for 
America interests in the Western Hemisphere, but his harsh methods violated American 
desires to support international human rights.  Carter’s intentions to remove military and 
economic aid from Somoza’s regime are clear in a memo prepared for him by 
Brzezinski.264   
Without American support, Somoza fell, but Cuban-backed Sandinistas soon 
gained control of Nicaragua, frustrating American plans.  In a reversal of his Somoza 
policy, Carter offered the Sandinistas aid incentives even though the Sandinistas had 
committed human rights violations of their own.  Reports of summary executions made 
the newspapers; one report claiming that thousands of members of the Somoza regime 
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and their families had been shot.265  In a Congressional working breakfast session, Carter 
urged support for a huge supplemental aid package to Nicaragua, laying out several 
incentives for the Sandinistas and stressing the prevention of a Nicaragua-Soviet-Cuba 
alliance.266   
The geopolitical situations in the Middle East and Central America forced Carter 
to amend his foreign policies, as did the threat of Soviet involvement in those areas.  
Challenges from Congress only compounded these problems, as Jimmy Carter did not 
have a harmonious relationship with Capitol Hill.  Through the course of his 
administration, he had lost in four Congressional votes -- a poorer record than either 
Kennedy or Johnson, and only slightly better than Nixon -- despite Democratic control of 
the House for his entire presidency and control of the Senate except for his last year in 
office.267   Early in his term, those poor relations with Congress became apparent when 
loss of a vote on a domestic issue caused heated debate and criticism from Congress.  The 
president's staff responded to several specific criticisms by claiming that the current poor 
executive-congressional relations were an ongoing problem that had begun in the prior to 
his administration and had only grown worse since Carter took office.268     
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Senator James B. Allen (D-Alabama) typified the congressional resistance.  
Opposing Jimmy Carter’s Panama Canal policy, Allen noted that Carter had reneged on a 
campaign promise when he signed the Panama Canal Treaty, for in a 1976 debate with 
Gerald Ford, he had taken a hardline stance towards maintaining American control of the 
canal.269  The president’s move to push forward a treaty early in his term, although 
unexpected by some and contested by many, did nest well with his national security 
strategy.  However, congressional efforts to alter the spirit of the agreement dogged 
Carter’s team, with Senator Allen urging an indefinite presence of American military to 
defend and maintain neutrality of the canal.270  The president’s administration spent a 
great deal of energy battling Allen and others, finally securing ratification by a slim 
margin. 
 Congress and Carter were often at odds over the budget, too.  Although the 
president was able to achieve an initial cut in the defense budget that halted the B-1 
Bomber, National Security Advisor Brzezinski was concerned about his long-range 
budget planning.  In a March 1978 memo to the president, Brzezinski pointedly noted the 
budget's foreign policy implications and that economics alone should not guide it.  
America’s friends and enemies, he argued, took cues from the Department of Defense 
funding and arms control efforts.271  Brzezinski’s warning soon became a reality when 
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the Soviets interpreted Carter’s budget actions as an American retreat and stepped up 
their military activities. 
The near-constant resistance from Congress played a significant role in Jimmy 
Carter’s dim prospects for reelection.  As America’s national politics played out in the 
international media, other governments noted his weakened congressional and public 
support.  This magnified the 1980 election's effect on Carter’s foreign policy, his “lame 
duck” status being a relevant factor in the Iranian Hostage crisis.  One memo from CIA 
Director Stansfield Turner warned that the time for accomplishing any agreement with 
the Iranians before Ronald Reagan’s inauguration was running out and that the Iranians 
had to believe that they would get a better deal from Carter for that agreement to 
happen.272  Despite Turner’s efforts, Iran rebuffed Carter, and hostage recovery efforts hit 
a dead end until the new administration came to power. 
Carter also spent money on foreign humanitarian assistance for the first three 
years of his presidency despite the voting public's disapproval.  Only when his bid for 
reelection neared did he begin to regard domestic political consequences seriously, 
proposing a significant reduction in foreign humanitarian aid.  But that change, of course, 
did not help America’s best interests abroad, and it came too late to satisfy a political 
base more interested in domestic programs.273 
Hamilton Jordan's White House staff study, conducted late in Carter’s first year in 
office, shows the effect of those domestic concerns on the president’s foreign policies.  In 
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his findings and recommendations, Jordan urged Carter to change the way his 
administration developed and implemented foreign policy.  Especially concerned that 
newspapers and political opponents were capitalizing on leaked national security policy 
plans, he favored active preemption of leaks rather than reacting to them after the fact.274  
Throughout his administration, Carter struggled to keep his foreign policy formulation 
free of domestic politics, yet his efforts to make them more transparent made that 
struggle more difficult.  While the president’s public image affected U.S. foreign 
relations, so did domestic energy programs. 
President Carter’s national address on the energy crisis backfired on him.  His 
perceptions of a declining national mood and consequent call for civil cooperation in 
making America better became famously known as the “Malaise Speech.”  American 
lack of respect and confidence in its institutions had, in his estimation, caused a gap 
between society and government.  While his conclusions were debatable, that plea for 
Americans to have faith in each other and the administration clearly overshadowed his 
efforts to gain support for his energy programs.  Public support declined as a result, and 
many of Carter's former supporters concluded that he was a weak and ineffective 
president.  Newspaper columnist Anthony Lewis aptly expressed the national attitude 
towards the president by writing that Carter’s character had not translated itself into the 
sort of leadership that makes Washington work.275  
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Jimmy Carter’s few foreign policy successes occurred early in his administration, 
with GPACED preventing the accomplishment of his favorite goals.  Instead, it 
compelled him to carry out those foreign policies he had most wanted to avoid.  The 
previous administration did not affect Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy, but the GPACED's 
other elements exerted significant pressures, nevertheless.  Figure 7 illustrates the Carter 
administration’s struggle against the system and eventual reversal of his chosen foreign 
policy goals.  Although GPACED forced him to pursue those reversed objectives for new 
reasons, GPACED was still the deciding factor in dictating the course of his foreign 























 Each of the presidents discussed in the preceding chapters came into office with 
clear foreign policy goals but, although each administration met some of those goals with 
relative ease, unforeseen challenges were the norm.  Often compelled to undertake 
strategies not of their choosing, and sometimes prevented from accomplishing their 
chosen foreign policies altogether, those presidents faced complex patterns of influence 
that were impossible to control even when their effects were obvious.  That such a murky 
process as GPACED produced such clear results might seem counterintuitive were it not 
a shared tendency of six consecutive administrations.  All of the presidents in this study 
tended to achieve crucial foreign policy goals early in their terms, while later efforts in 
line with previously stated objectives encountered more resistance. 
 A second tendency is that GPACED compels administrations to act more often 
than it compels them to sit still.  All but Nixon and Ford took actions not of their 
choosing, but even compromise involves more action than inaction.  Those two 
exceptions encountered more delays and obstructions than pushes from Congress, a 
possible result of Nixon’s impeachable criminal activities and subsequent resignation. 
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 Figure 8 displays foreign policies forced on administrations along with 
accompanying trends.   The numbers in each block represent the instances when the 
system altered foreign policies, either by compulsion or prevention. 
 A third tendency is that some elements of GPACED usually carry more influence 
than others.  In the preceding historical case studies, the most influential element is the 
geopolitical environment, an unpredictable element that causes administrations to react 
rather than act.  In terms of influence and leverage on presidential administrations, 
Congress runs a close second. 
 Figure 9 illustrates the number of instances that each element of GPACED 
exerted a significant influence on foreign policies.  In all but one case study, the 
geopolitical environment is the most cited element, although Congress affected the Nixon 
and Ford administrations as much, Watergate being the likely factor in this increased 
 




Congressional activity.  The most influential element after Congress is the prior 
administration, but there is an exception here as well.  The Carter Administration did not 
encounter significant prior administration influence on foreign policy, probably because 
Congress had exerted such an extreme impact on Ford’s presidency, effectively 
preventing him from accomplishing anything of significance in the wake of Vietnam and 
Watergate. 
 Examining these historical examples through the lenses of GPACED 
demonstrates the effects of the system on presidential freedom of action where foreign 
policy development and execution is concerned.   
More than the president, the GPACED system establishes what can be done, what must 
be done, and the direction an administration will go by defining the environment, the 
problem set, and choices available.  And because the executive selects foreign policy 
 




actions within the confines of GPACED, he must frequently choose between the lesser of 
two evils.  Presidents are remembered for these choices, which history often judges to be 
poor, yet the systemic constraints that lead to these choices seldom draw as much 
attention.  An appreciation of GPACED allows us to see these presidential decisions in a 
different light.  Neither absolving individual presidents nor removing ownership of key 
foreign policy actions from them, it nevertheless enables a broader understanding of 
presidential foreign policy decision making.  In the end, it shows us how often those 
decisions were forced by the system rather than chosen by an individual acting solely on 
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(Parsons) to Acting Secretary of State.  by J. Graham Parsons. Washington, D.C.: 
FRUS, 1959.  https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1958-60v17/d236. 
This memo to President Eisenhower discusses progress towards U.S. goals in 
Indonesia and the current threat of communism.  It also discusses foreign military 
assistance and how the assistance should not be tied to downed aviator Allen 
Pope.  The memo also assesses that the Indonesians suspect Pope worked for the 
American government but will not bring that information to the public during his 





------. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, by Cyrus Vance.  
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1978.  Carter Library, National Security Affairs, 
Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 2/78. Secret. 
Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote: “Cy.” https://history.state. 
gov/historical documents/frus1977-80v29/d149.  This memo from Vance to 
Carter discusses the upcoming vote to ratify the Panama Canal Treaty.  Vance 
tells of an effort to amend the treaty with the provision that a president can 
maintain U.S. troops at the Panama Canal if there is a need to defend or compel 
neutrality.  Vance reports that Senator Byrd can table this amendment.  
 
------. Memorandum of Conversation. Ogorevo, Russia: FRUS, 1959.    
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v08/d481.  This is a 
transcript of a discussion between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Vice President 
Nixon.  Nixon met with the Premier while on a trip to Moscow to open a US 
exhibit at the Moscow Fair.    
 
------. The Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Department of State. by John 
Peurifoy. Guatemala City, Guatemala: FRUS, 1954.  https://history.state. gov 
/historical documents/frus1952-54v04/d461.  This telegram from Ambassador 
Peurifoy describes improving conditions in Guatemala.  The ambassador 
recommends courses of action that American government could take to raise 
tensions to help destabilize the country.    
 
------. Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State.  by Robert 
McClintock. Beirut, Lebanon: FRUS, 1958.  https://history. state.gov/historical 
documents/frus1958-60v11/d141. This telegram from Ambassador McClintock 
describes his meeting with the Lebanese army commander.  McClintock’s efforts 
to gain the commander’s trust are hampered by the ambassador’s lack of 
information on the U.S. military operation in Beirut.    
 
------. The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State.  by Jeffrey Caffery.  
Cairo, Egypt: FRUS, 1951.  https://history.state. gov/historical 
documents/frus1951v05/d178. This is a telegram Caffery sent advising the State 
Department on negative actions taken by British military authorities in the Suez 
Canal Zone.  The British cut off fuel supplies to Suez in retaliation for locals 
interference with the British train system that supported canal operations.     
 
White House. Congressional Leadership Breakfast.  by Frank Moore.  Washington D.C.: 
White House, 1979.  Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential 
Files; Folder: 12/11/79; Container 142.  https://www.jimmycarterlibrary. 
gov/digital_ library/sso/148878/142/SSO_148878_142_02.pdf.  This information 
package was assembled for a working breakfast Carter held with members of 
Congress.  The packet included schedules and topics of discussion.  Specific 
talking points for Carter were prepared for each topic.  One topic is Nicaraguan 




------. Lyndon B. Johnson's Daily Diary: October 16, 1968, (Washington, D.C.: White 
House, 1968), 5. http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/lbj_tools/daily_diary/pdf/ 
1968/19681016.pdf.  This is the daily log of presidential activities.  The log has 
several entries of various visitors to President Johnson.  One visit was from 
Senator Dirksen whom the president was upset with, because Dirksen gave a 
speech claiming Johnson was trying to gain a peace deal instead of winning the 
war to sway votes for the election.    
 
------. Early Month’s Performance, Hamilton Jordon.  Washington D.C.: White House, 
1977.  Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, 
Early Months' Performance, HJ Memos to Pres., 1977, Container 34a. 
https://www.jimmy carterlibrary.gov/digital library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_ 
34a_17-Early_Months_Performance_HJ_Memos.pdf.  This memo to President 
Carter from his COS Hamilton Jordon, discusses Jordon’s observations during his 
early months as COS.  Jordon praises the president but admonishes him to do a 
better job scheduling his political requirements to prevent arbitrary decision 
making.  He also wants the president to consider the impact his decisions has on 
other projects.  
 
------. Letter from President Kennedy to Vice President Johnson. by John F. Kennedy. 
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961.  https://history.state.gov/historical 
documents/frus1961-63v25/d5.   This letter from JFK to vice president LBJ 
directs Johnson to chair the NSC meetings for him.  The president tells Johnson to 
prepare himself by obtaining relevant foreign policy information to attended the 
NSC meetings.    
 
------. Letter from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the President. by 
Maxwell Taylor.  Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961. https://history.state.gov 
/historical documents/frus1961-63v01/d210.  This is a trip report from General 
Maxwell Taylor’s assessment tour of South EastAsia for the president.  Maxwell 
sees the need for military assistance in most countries and probable intervention 
in Vietnam to prevent communist forces from overtaking the country.    
 
------.  Memorandum by the Chairmen of Exxon Corporation (Jamieson), Mobil Oil 
Corporation (Warner), Texaco, Inc. (Granville), and Standard Oil Company of 
California (Miller).  by J. K. Jamieson, Maurice F. Granville, Rawleigh Warner, 
Jr. and Otto N. Miller.  Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1973.  
https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1969-76v36/d212.  This letter 
from the chairmen of several major oil corporations was sent to President Nixon 
after the Saudi and Kuwaiti oil embargo threat of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  The 
chairmen explain the dire circumstances of the oil embargo to the balance of 
world energy production.  They also believe that America’s position in the Middle 
East will be usurped by the Soviets if the embargo is challenged.  They ask the 




------.  Memorandum for the President: The Need for a Definition of US Objectives in SE 
Asia.  by Chester Bowles.  Washington D.C.: White House, 1962.  
https://www.jfk library.org/asset-viewer/archives/JCTPP/008/JCTPP-008-012.  
This memorandum for the JFK admonishes him to develop a clear policy for 
American involvement in South East Asia.  Bowles informs the president that US 
actions in the region have been undertaken with no clear national objectives.  
Bowles’ opinion is that America’s actions are reactionary and at the will of global 
forces.   
 
------. Memorandum for the President: Measures to Obtain the Release of the RB-47 
Officers, November 10, 1960, Box 10, NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 
Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Library.   This memo from the Sec of State and Sec of Defense is a 
recommendation for action against the Soviets to obtain the release of two 
captured US spy plane pilots.  The plan calls for two phases of action.  Phase II 
was the denial of Soviet ships and aircraft from operating in US territory.   Phase 
III was the harassment of Russian ships in international waters and the deliberate 
downing of a Soviet military airplane in international waters.   
 
------.  Memorandum from the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) 
to President Johnson.  by Carl T. Rowan.  Washington D.C.: White House, 1965.  
https://libguides.msubillings.edu/c.php?g=242157&p=1610550.  Johnson’s 
director of information advises him that it will be difficult to justify America’s 
large intervention in the Dominican Republic.  Suggestions were made to mitigate 
the possibility of demonstrations at American missions throughout Latin America.   
 
------. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
(Bundy) to President Johnson: Agenda for Tuesday Lunch. by McGeorge Bundy. 
Washington D.C.: White House, 1965.  https://libguides. msubillings.edu/c.php? 
g=242157&p=1610550.  This memo from Bundy to Johnson lays out the agenda 
for the upcoming Tuesday’s lunch.  Bundy chides Johnson to establish direct 
communication with the Soviets.   
 
------. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President 
Kennedy: British Guiana. by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 
1961. 525.  https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d249. 
Memo from Art Schlesinger to Kennedy outlining a course of action for British 
Guiana.   He recommends working with Jagan while at the same time running 









------. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
(Bundy) to President Kennedy. by McGeorge Bundy.  Washington D.C.: FRUS, 
1961.  https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v10/d39.  
Bundy tells of disagreement between DOD and the CIA with DOS.   DOS 
recommends caution and careful diplomatic preparation before invading Cuba 
with U.S. backed dissidents.  DOD and CIA are enthusiastic about the chances 
of success for the invasion.  Bundy agrees with DOS and recommends JFK 
consider DOS concerns.   
 
------. Memorandum from the President’s Special Representative for National Security 
Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy. by McGeorge Bundy.  Washington D.C.: 
FRUS, 1962.  https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v24/d296.  
This memo describes the background leading up to the current situation in Laos.  
Bundy describes the Laotian government’s force’s inability to hold against an 
overwhelming communist force, backed up by NVA regulars and Soviet 
equipment.  
 
------. Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President 
Johnson: Rolling Thunder 53, by Walter Rostow. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1967.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d25.  This memo 
from the NSA to Johnson goes over a list of targets the JCS is asking for 
permission to bomb during the Vietnam War in 1967.   The memo refers to maps 
that the president uses to reference each target.    
 
------. Memorandum for the President: Your Lunch with Rep. John Murphy.  by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.  Washington D.C.: White House, 1979.  Collection: Office of Staff 
Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 1/19/79; Container 103.  
https://www.jimmy 
carterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/103/SSO_148878_103_12.pdf.  This 
memorandum from Carter’s NSA provides talking points for the president to use 
with Senator Murphy.  Murphy is pro-Somoza regime.  Carter is against Somoza, 
but needs Murphy’s support for congressional legislation.    
 
------. Memorandum for the Record:First Meeting of General Maxwell Taylor’s Board 
of Inquiry on Cuban Operations Conducted by CIA. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 
1961.  https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v10/d169.  
This document is a transcript of General Maxwell Taylor’s first meeting into 










------. Memorandum: Jim Mcintyre's Memo of March 1 Concerning Plans for 1980 
Budget, by Zbigniew Brzezinski.  Washington D.C.: White House, 1978.  
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/ 148878/68/SSO 
_148878_068_11.pdf.  This memo from NSA Brzezinski to President Carter is in 
reference to budget planning for FY 1980.  The OMB is isolating the early 
planning to departments with an economic focus.   Brzezinski wants the president 
to force the OMB to ensure that the NSC and Defense Department are included in 
the budget planning early in the process.   
 
------. Memorandum of Conversation, January 27, 1976, folder: “National Security 
Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977”, box 17, Memoranda of 
Conversations, Ford Administration, Gerald R. Ford Library. https://www.ford 
librarymuseum.gov/library /document/0314/1553349.pdf White.  This is a 
transcript of a discussion Ford has with his UN Ambassador and National 
Security Advisor.  Ford is upset over Congress’ refusal to provide funds to 
support Angola against Cuban-back rebel forces.  Ford complains that Congress is 
weak and should have to publicly vote to display their soft stances on the Soviets.    
 
------. Memorandum of Conversation, by Henry Kissinger.  Washington D.C.: FRUS, 
1969.  https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1969-76v32/d96.  
Kissinger and Dobrynin discuss arms control talks.   They speak of combining 
most aspects under a single agreement and other technical aspects of arms control.  
Kissinger remarks that US lead arms control negotiator Smith is not allowed to 
make decisions on certain aspects of the agreement.   
 
------. Memorandum of Conversation, by Henry Kissinger.  Washington D.C.: FRUS, 
1972.  https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1969-76v15/d25.  Record 
of conversation between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.  The two 
discuss several topics including Middle East issues, nuclear agreements, and 
Vietnam and the impact of the American presidential elections on negotiating 
with Vietnam.    
 
------. Memorandum of Conversation. by Dr. Akalovsky.  Vienna, Austria: FRUS, 1961.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v05/d87.  This is an 
account of the conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev at the Vienna 
Conference to discuss the 1961 Belin Crisis.  The topics of discussions are far 
ranging, covering South East Asia, nuclear disarmament, Berlin, divided 
Germany, and a host of other issues.   
 
------. Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy. by John McCone.  Washington 
D.C., FRUS, 1962.  https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-
63v10/d385.  This memo describes a meeting between JFK and his principle 
foreign policy advisors.  The discussion centered on planning for the possibility 
that the Soviets would demand removal of U.S. installations in Cuban territory.  
The removal of obsolete Jupiter missile systems stationed in Turkey was also 
discussed during this meeting.    
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------. Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, 
Congress/President, Container 34a.  https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital 
_library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_34a_10-Congress_president.pdf.   COS 
memo addressing why a bill failed in Congress.   The memo discusses the origins 
of congressional friction with the executive branch.  It states that some of the 
issues are related to Carter’s administration.   
 
------. Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; 





1978_Charts.pdf. This is a compilation of assessments of congressional support 
studies and notes about Carter’s staff in 1977.  It breaks down members by 
various demographics.  The assessment includes notes for each congress member.    
 
------. Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series: Hamilton Jordan's 
Confidential Files; Folder: Administration Review, Goals & Priorities-First Draft 
of December 1977 Memo; Container 33.  https://www.jimmy 
carterlibrary.gov/digital _library/cos/142099/33/cos_142099_33_02-
Administration_Review_Goals_&_ 
Priorities_First_Draft_of_December_1977_Memo.pd.  This document is a staff 
study conducted by Jordon Hamilton before he took over as Carter’s COS.  
Hamilton uses diagrams and examples to illustrate the current White House staff 
processes.  Included in this study are critiques of the current processes and 
recommendations for improvements.   
 
------.  National Security Action Memorandum No, 273.  by McGeorge Bundy. 
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1963.  https://history.state.gov/ historical 
documents/frus1961-63v04/d331.  This presidential directive on Vietnam outlined 
the general policy of American activities in the conflict.  The goal was to set 
conditions that enabled the government of South Vietnam to maintain its own 
security and defend against the Viet Cong and North Vietnam.  Once these 
conditions were set, American military forces were to be withdrawn from the 
conflict.   
 
------. Presidential Directive / NSC-2: The National Security Council System.  Jimmy 
Carter.  Washington D.C.: White House, 1977.  
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/ assets/documents/directives/pd02.pdf.   This 
document describes the reorganization of President Carter’s national security 
council system.  It establishes council membership, subcommittees, and ad hoc 





------. Presidential Directive / NSC-18: U.S. National Strategy.  Jimmy Carter.  
Washington D.C.: White House, 1977.  
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets /documents/directives/pd18.pdf.  This 
document describes the President Carter’s national security strategy.  It outlines 
the goals, responsibilities, and regional focus for America’s foreign policy. 
 
------. Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-59: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, 
Jimmy Carter.  Washington D.C.: White House, 1980.  
https://jimmycarterlibrary.gov /assets/documents/directives/pd59.pdf.  This policy 
authorized by Carter directed the study and planning for winning a nuclear war 
with the Soviets.   The directive emphasized winning the fight versus simply 
surviving a nuclear attack.   Notable was the explicit direction to target Soviet 
civilian activities that supported military capability.    
 
------.  Presidential Remarks on Signing of the Trade Act of 1974: Friday, January 3, 
1975. by Gerald Ford.  Washington D.C.: White House, 1975.  
https://www.fordlibrary museum.gov/library/document/0122/1252185.pdf.  Ford 
comments on his signing of the 1974 Trade Act into law.  He writes that the law 
will be difficult to implement.  The law will also not be received well by other 
countries.    
 
------.  Reaction to Soviet to the Soviet Satellite. White House Office of the Staff Research 
Group. October 16, 1957. Box 35, Special Projects: Sputnik, Missiles and Related 
Matters.  https://www.eisenhower library.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-
documents/sputnik/reaction.pdf.   This special report assesses the impact of the 
Soviets successful orbit of the Sputnik satellite.  It describes America as being 
weakened, with the country’s prestige suffering a severe blow.  It also reports that 
several nations have made statements regarding potentially aligning with the 
Soviets due to their perceived superiority in missile and space technology.   
 
------. Summary of Conference at White House. by William H. Jackson.  Washington 
D.C.: White House.  https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/ 
default/files/research /online-documents/declassified/fy-2011/1956-09-11.pdf.  
This is a summary of a meeting chaired by President Eisenhower.  The topic was 
how much strategic weapons-grade nuclear fissible material should be produced 
and maintained.  Discussions also included civilian applications for atomic power.    
 
------. Telephone Call to the President at Augusta, Georgia. J.M.  Washington D.C.: 
White House, 1958.  https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/ default/files/ 
file/declass_fy16_21.pdf.  This memorandum of record relates telephone calls 
between Eisenhower and a member of the White House staff.  The topic is 
American efforts to maintain the King of Jordan’s hold over his country.  
Concerns of King Hussain are discussed, including requests from the King to help 
him improve his security situation.  The president comments on how funding cuts 




------. Telephone Conversation with General Eisenhower. Folder, "January 31, 1968 - 
8:40 a.m. Pueblo 13 - Breakfast with Congressional Leaders & Advisors." 
Papers of Tom Johnson. Box 2. LBJ Presidential Library. 
https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/pp-johnsontom-mtgnotes-b02-f17.  This 
memo is a transcript of a telephone conversation between General Eisenhower 
and General Goodpastor.  The topic was the seizure of the Pueblo spy ship by 
the North Koreans.  Goodpastor asks Eisenhower’s advice on how to deal with 
the situation.  Eisenhower offers a range of options ranging from naval 
blockade to use of atomic weapons.   
 
------. Telegram from President Kennedy to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith).  by 
John F. Kennedy.  Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962.  https://history.state.gov/ 
historical documents/frus1961-63v19/d267.  This telegram from JFK to the 
American ambassador to India instructs the ambassador to work with the Indians 
for cooperation in the Kashmir issue.  JFK tells that his public statement should 
not be misconstrued as lacking support for India.  The president also says there is 
little time for him to secure funding for India because of pressure from Congress.   
 
------.  Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield. 
by Mike Mansfield and Lyndon Baines Johnson.  Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1964.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d231.  Telephone 
conversation between Jonson and Mansfield discussing Cuba’s shutting off 
Guantanamo’s water supply in protest of Cuban fishermen detained by Florida 
fishing authorities.  The president agreed that establishing their own water supply 
would be the best response to Castro.   
 
------. Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and European Regional Organizations.  by Dean Rusk.  
Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1964.  https://history.state.gov/ historical 
documents/frus1964-68v13/d191.  Rusk sent a telegram to NATO contesting 
France’s demand to have all NATO troops and equipment withdrawn from France 
by April.  Rusk also wanted clarification on NATO forces’ abilities to use French 
territory in times of emergency.   
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